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“[T]here is always a well-known solution to every human problem—
neat, plausible, and wrong.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Florida Supreme Court breathed new life into H. L. Mencken’s 
axiom with its decision in Whiley v. Scott.2  Upon taking office in 2011, 
Governor Rick Scott ordered agencies under his direction to suspend 
administrative rulemaking pending further review by his office.3  A food 
stamp recipient bypassed the trial and intermediate Florida appellate courts 
by filing an original action in the Florida Supreme Court, in the form of a 
petition for writ of quo warranto, arguing the governor had no authority to 
order such a suspension.4  A majority of the court opined that the governor 
lacked authority to direct his at-will appointees to suspend administrative 
rulemaking.5  Over the vigorous dissents of the Chief Justice and another 
member of the court, the majority concluded: (1) the legislature could place 
administrative agencies under the complete control of at-will gubernatorial 
appointees, and (2) neither the supreme executive power constitutionally 
vested in the governor, nor the authority to remove at-will appointees, 
authorized the governor to direct these agency heads without further 
statutory authority.6 
 The majority found the exercise of administrative rulemaking authority 
by subordinate agency heads—appointed by and serving at the pleasure of 
the governor—was not subject to the governor’s direction or supervision 
 
* Eric H. Miller, B.A. (Florida State University 1978), M.A. (Florida State University 2012), 
J.D. (Florida State University 1984). Admitted to The Florida Bar (1984) and to the U.S. 
District Courts for the Northern (1991), Middle (1985), and Southern (1991) Districts of 
Florida. Board Certified by The Florida Bar in State & Federal Government and 
Administrative Practice (2008). Mr. Miller has practiced privately and in government 
agencies in administrative, bankruptcy, civil, commercial, and constitutional law.  Since 2010, 
he has served on the staff of the Florida House of Representatives.  
 1 H.L. Mencken, Prejudices: Second Series, 158 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1920).   
 2  79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011). 
 3  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 (Jan. 4, 2011).  
 4  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. 
SC11-592). 
 5  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, at 705 (Fla. 2011). 
 6  Id. at 715. 
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because the legislature had not empowered such oversight.7  Narrowly 
viewing the agency’s rulemaking as controlled exclusively by the legislature, 
the majority ignored the full extent of constitutionally vested executive 
power, failed to follow the court’s own principles of constitutional 
interpretation, and relied instead on the questionable reasoning in a dormant 
attorney general’s opinion.8  The decision effectively recognized a “fourth 
branch of government”—agency heads appointed by and serving at the 
pleasure of the governor, but immune from gubernatorial direction and 
supervision.9  Finding “the power to remove is not analogous to the power 
to control,” the court invited the legislature to clarify the law.10 
Accepting the invitation, the legislature passed Chapter 2012-116, 
Laws of Florida.11  The law confirmed: (a) all but one of the governor’s 
actions conformed with existing law; (b) all appointed agency heads 
remained subordinate to the direction and supervision of the governor (or 
other appointing authority, such as the cabinet); and (c) as a procedural 
statute, the Florida Administrative Procedure Act12 operates within the 
structure of constitutional executive power.13  Twenty-six legislative 
findings grounded the law on Florida’s historical understanding and 
application of the constitutional executive power since Florida’s founding.14  
Quoting The Federalist, tracing the development of the executive article in 
each succeeding version of the Florida Constitution, and citing the historical 
record on the framing of the present document, the legislature approved the 
Whiley dissenters’ analysis as properly articulating both the Constitution and 
the legislative intent for the statutory structure of the executive branch.15 
Proper analysis of the majority’s opinion and the subsequent legislative 
response16 requires an understanding of the constitutional context of 
executive power in Florida and the implementation of executive authority 
under the 1968 Florida Constitution.  This article examines the issues and 
arguments before the court, the majority and dissenting opinions, and the 
principles of constitutional interpretation from which the majority strayed 
based largely on an isolated attorney general opinion.  The article discusses 
the decision’s consequences, questioning both the efficacy of proceeding in 
 
 7  Id. at 716–717.   
 8  FLA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AGO 81-49, EXECUTIVE ORDER AS BINDING ORDER 
(1981) (hereinafter “AGO 81-49”). 
 9  See Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713–714. 
 10  Id. at 715, 717. 
 11  See 2012 Fla. Laws 116. 
 12  FLA. STAT. § 120 (2012). 
 13  2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 1, 2. 
 14  2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1.  
 15  2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(26)(b). 
 16  See, e.g., 2012 Fla. Laws 116. 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2019  11:09 AM 
4 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
quo warranto and whether the opinion has any precedential effect because 
the writ itself was withheld.  Finally, the article analyzes how the subsequent 
legislation reaffirmed the Florida executive branch’s historical, 
constitutionally vested executive power.  By contrasting the restricted 
construction adopted by the majority with a proper interpretation of the 
Florida Constitution, the article shows the majority’s opinion is neat and 
plausible, but wrong. 
A. Historical Context of Constitutional Executive Power in Florida 
Analyzing the court’s competing rationales first requires understanding 
the historical context and development of the Florida Constitution, as well 
as the implementation of executive authority by the Florida Legislature and 
succeeding governors.17 
Florida’s first Constitution was based on fifty years’ experience of both 
national and state executive power.18  In 1789, the United States Congress 
concluded that the constitutional grant of executive power to the President 
implied the inherent authority to direct, control, and remove those officers 
appointed to serve at the President’s pleasure.19  The vesting and limiting of 
executive power in contemporary and subsequent state constitutions 
followed a similar pattern: the plenary executive authority was placed in the 
executive branch, subject to express limitations, and the chief magistrate 
(usually denominated “governor”) was responsible for exercising the full 
executive power, except as otherwise clearly provided.20  Because state 
constitutions often limited executive power by allocating specific functions 
to other officers, the authority vested in the governor was called the 
“supreme executive power.”21  This distinguished the governor’s 
responsibilities from specific, separately-allocated powers to ensure the 
complete exercise of the full executive power.22  Similar to its use in 
constitutional articles vesting judicial power by creating more than one court, 
the word “supreme” connoted a hierarchy of responsibility within the 
executive branch.23 
Every version of the Florida Constitution used the same phrasing in the 
 
 17  See Eric H. Miller, The Historical Development of Executive Branch Oversight and 
Control in Florida: 1838–1968, 13 AVE MARIA L. REV. 371 (2015) (hereinafter “Historical 
Development”); Eric H. Miller, The Direction and Supervision by Elected Officials of Florida 
Executive Branch Agencies and Administrative Rulemaking: 1968–2012, 12 AVE MARIA L. 
REV. 333 (2014) (hereinafter “Direction and Supervision”). 
 18  Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 394. 
 19  Id. at 387–88. 
 20  Id. at 390–94. 
 21  Id.  
 22  Id. at 390, 394. 
 23  Id. at 397. 
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executive article to describe the power and authority of the governor.24  
Numerous amendments to the various executive articles neither constrained 
the executive authority over at-will gubernatorial appointees nor impliedly 
authorized such officers to act independently from the governor’s control.25  
The framers revised the executive article in the 1968 Constitution, 
particularly those provisions concerning executive branch reorganization, 
only after expressly rejecting legislative control over the direction and 
supervision of subordinate appointees by constitutional officers.26 
The 1968 constitutional revisions impacted the structure of Florida’s 
modern executive branch.  Substantively, the legislature restructured the 
executive agencies by placing most under the authority of an appointee 
serving at the pleasure of the governor.27  Procedurally, the legislature 
created the Florida Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)28 to provide the 
uniform processes all administrative agencies must follow when performing 
their statutory duties.29  Numerous governors showed a common 
interpretation of their constitutional authority, particularly over the 
implementation of general policy through agency rulemaking, by directing 
and supervising the form, content, and goals of rules adopted by 
administrative agencies.30  While monitoring and periodically revising the 
requirements for rulemaking, the legislature never raised a concern about the 
direction and control of appointed agency heads by the various governors.31 
This legislative inaction made an anomalous 1981 attorney general 
opinion all the more curious.32  Ignoring the historical context of executive 
power in Florida, and failing to read properly the pertinent sections of the 
executive article,33 the attorney general opinion concluded that the governor 
could not direct and supervise agency rulemaking because the legislature 
only authorized the exercise of rulemaking power by the at-will, subordinate 
appointees, rather than the governor.34  The subsequent conduct of both the 
legislature and the various governors showed a settled understanding of the 
Constitution directly opposite to this conclusion, and the opinion remained 
 
 24  Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 377–78. 
 25  Id. at 397–405. 
 26  Id. at 412–14. 
 27  See 1969 Fla. Laws 106. 
 28  FLA. STAT. § 120 (2012). 
 29  FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012). 
 30  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–52. 
 31  See, e.g., 1996 Fla. Laws 159; 1999 Fla. Laws 379; 2010 Fla. Laws 279; 2011 Fla. 
Laws 225; 2016 Fla. Laws 116. 
 32  FLA. OFF. OF THE ATT’Y GEN., AGO 81-49, EXECUTIVE ORDER AS BINDING ORDER 
(1981) (hereinafter “AGO 81-49”); see Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 
354–57. 
 33  FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6 (1968). 
 34  AGO 81-49.  
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dormant for thirty years.35 
It would return. 
II. PROLOGUE TO QUO WARRANTO 
Rosalie Whiley filed a petition for writ of quo warranto in the Florida 
Supreme Court, requesting a ruling that newly-elected Governor Rick Scott 
had no power to suspend, direct, supervise, or otherwise interfere with 
agency rulemaking.36  This issue was already part of pending, actively-
contested litigation predating the new governor’s election in November 
2010.37  The following discussion shows the development of the issues in the 
Etienne case and their relevance to the Whiley petition. 
A. Etienne v. DCF 
Eva Etienne sought continued benefits under the Supplemental 
Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”)38 by applying for renewal online.39  
The existing online form40 did not permit an application using minimum 
personal information.  Etienne challenged the applicable administrative rule 
as an invalid exercise of the Department of Children and Family Services’ 
(DCF) delegated rulemaking authority.41  DCF requested a continuance of 
the final hearing to initiate rulemaking revising the online form.  Although 
Etienne’s counsel objected to any delay, arguing the challenge process better 
 
 35  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General in Support of Respondent at 16–17, Whiley v. 
Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592). 
 36  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4.  
 37  See Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Case nos. 10-005141RP, 10-
009516RP, 10-010105RP (Florida Division of Administrative Hearings 2010), 
http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ALJ/searchDOAH (last visited Nov. 9, 2018). The information 
about the Etienne litigation is drawn from the three cases filed with the Florida Division of 
Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), each styled Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family 
Servs., later consolidated into one proceeding under Case No. 10-005141RP. 
 38  See, e.g. 7 U.S.C. § 2213 (2010). SNAP is funded through the U.S. Dept. of 
Agriculture and controlled primarily by USDA regulations.  In Florida, SNAP is administered 
through the Florida Dept. of Children and Family Services. 
 39  See Petition to Determine Invalidity of Access Rule 65A-1.400(1)(d), Etienne v. Dep’t 
of Children and Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (Florida Division of Administrative 
Hearings 2010), http://www.doah.state.fl.us/ALJ/searchDOAH (last visited Nov. 29, 2018). 
 40  ACCESS Online Application System, CF-ES Form 2353, Mar 08 (promulgated under 
authority of Florida Administrative Procedure Rule 65A-1.400(1)(d)). 
 41  Petition to Determine Invalidity of Access Rule 65A-1.4000(1)(d), Etienne v. Dep’t 
of Children and Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (July 9, 2010). Florida law provides several 
opportunities for those substantially affected by agency rule to challenge whether the agency 
exceeded the authority delegated by the legislature. Proposed rules may be challenged under 
FLA. STAT. § 120.56(2)-(3) (2018). “Invalid exercise of delegated legislative authority” is 
expressly defined by FLA. STAT. § 120.52(8) (2018), with particular reference to agency 
rulemaking. 
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protected Etienne’s rights,42 the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
continued the hearing.43  On September 10, 2010, DCF reported rulemaking 
progress, having published the notice of proposed Rule 65A-1.205(1), and 
requested a further continuance.44  Etienne objected because the parties 
fundamentally disagreed about the interpretation of key terms in the 
applicable federal regulations,45 but the ALJ continued the final hearing.46 
Etienne separately challenged DCF’s ACCESS CF-ES Form 2353, and 
that matter was consolidated with the original case.47  After the parties filed 
competing motions for a summary final order,48 Etienne filed a third petition 
challenging the published revisions to proposed Rule 65A-1.205(1), which 
was consolidated with the existing proceeding.49  The ALJ scheduled the 
final evidentiary hearing for March 2011,50 before hearing oral argument on 
the motions for summary final order on December 22, 2010. The 
consolidated cases were still pending when Governor Scott took office on 
January 4, 2011.51 
B. Executive Order 11-01 
Within an hour of taking office, Governor Scott issued “Executive 
Order Number 11-01 (Suspending Rulemaking and Establishing the Office 
 
 42  See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.56(1)(c), (1)(d) (2018). Administrative challenges to rules have 
strict statutory deadlines. In 2010, a petition complying with the statute was required to be 
assigned to an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) within 10 days of being filed with DOAH; 
the final evidentiary hearing was then required to be held within 30 days unless the ALJ 
granted a continuance agreed by the parties or for good cause shown. FLA. STAT. § 
120.56(1)(c) (2010). The ALJ’s final order was required to be rendered within 30 days from 
the hearing. FLA. STAT. § 120.56(1)(d) (2010). The present statutes require the same.  
 43  Order Granting Continuance and Canceling Hearing, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and 
Family Servs., No. 10-005141RP (Aug. 2, 2010).   
 44  Respondent’s First Status Report, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., No. 
10-005141RP (Sept. 10, 2010). 
 45  Response of Petitioner, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. No. 10-
005141RP (Sept. 16, 2010).   
 46  Order Continuing Abeyance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs. No. 10-
005141RP (Sept. 24, 2010).   
 47  Petition to Determine Invalidity of Proposed rule 65A-1.400(1)(d), supra note 41. See 
also Order of Consolidation, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-
5141RX & 10-9516RP (Oct. 14, 2010). ACCESS CF-ES Form 2353, dated September 2010, 
was published in Rule 65A-1.400 and incorporated by reference in proposed Rule 65A-
1.205(1). 
 48  FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(h) (2011). Analogous to a motion for summary final judgment 
in federal or state court. 
 49  Order Granting Motion for Consolidation and Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of 
Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Dec. 9, 2010).  
 50  Order Re-Scheduling Hearing, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 
10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Dec. 9, 2010).  
 51  See, e.g., Respondent’s Motion for Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and 
Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 7, 2011). 
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of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform)” (“EO 11-01”).52  The 
order cited several principles as its foundation, including the governor’s 
responsibilities for planning and budget and ensuring faithful compliance 
with the laws.53  EO 11-01 also stated “the administration of each state 
agency, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution, shall be placed by law 
under the direct supervision of the Governor . . . .”  This inaccurately 
rendered the principle that the governor has constitutional authority to direct 
and supervise executive branch departments headed by his or her at-will 
appointees.54 
The purpose of EO 11-01 was to ensure all agencies performed their 
duties, including regulatory actions and rulemaking, efficiently and 
effectively, with the least adverse economic impact on regulated entities or 
the general public.  In the order, the governor designated a section in the 
Executive Office of the Governor (“EOG”)55 as the Office of Fiscal 
Accountability and Regulatory Reform (“OFARR”), to implement this 
purpose.56  Among other responsibilities, the order charged OFARR with: 
(1) reviewing proposed or existing agency rules for compliance with the 
governor’s policy initiatives; (2) requiring agencies to assess the cost, 
benefit, risk, and effect on employment of each proposed rule; (3) identifying 
waste, fraud, or mismanagement in agency programs and recommending 
solutions; and (4) coordinating with other governmental accountability 
offices to identify rules disproportionately impacting small businesses.57  
The order required agencies “under the direction of the Governor” to 
designate a liaison to meet several responsibilities, including preparing 
annual regulatory plans to identify rules for amendment or repeal, and 
statutory mandates adversely impacting private businesses.58 
EO 11-01 required agencies under the governor’s direction to suspend 
pending rulemaking and submit all prospective rules for review and approval 
by the governor’s office.59  The key was whether the agency was a 
 
 52  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01 (Jan. 4, 2011).  
 53  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a).  The clause stating this authority was not part of the original 
language adopted in 1968 but was amended into the text as part of Revision Number 1 
submitted by the Taxation and Budget Reform Commission and approved by the voters on 
November 3, 1992. 
 54   Id. at §§ 1(a), 6. 
 55  FLA. STAT. § 14.201 (1979).  This is an administrative unit of the executive branch for 
which the governor is denominated expressly as the agency head.  
 56  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, § 3. 
 57  Id. 
 58  Id. at § 5. 
 59  Id. at §§ 1, 4.  The order also imposed a 90-day period during which agencies had to 
obtain OFARR approval before executing contracts exceeding $1 million in value. Id. at § 6. 
Agencies not under the governor’s direction were requested to participate in the suspension 
and review processes established by the Order. Id. at  § 2. 
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“Governor’s agency” subject to his direction and supervision; the order drew 
a distinction from those agencies clearly placed under another constitutional 
entity.  The use of this distinction is understandable based on the history and 
tradition of the constitutional offices and statutory precedent.  When creating 
the Citizen’s Assistance Office within the EOG in 1979, the legislature 
authorized it to “[i]nvestigate . . . any administrative action of any state 
agency, the administration of which is under the direct supervision of the 
Governor . . . .”60  The Office of Suicide Prevention, administratively housed 
in DCF, receives information and support from “[a]gencies under the control 
of the Governor or the Governor and Cabinet . . . .”61  Finally, the Chief 
Inspector General is responsible “for promoting accountability, integrity, 
and efficiency in the agencies under the jurisdiction of the Governor.”62  
Each statute, while worded differently, conveys the same concept—the 
legislature recognizes the governor’s authority over a number of 
administrative agencies beyond the EOG. 
EO 11-01 clearly conflicted with statutory law on one point: the 
governor ordered the secretary of state not to publish rulemaking notices 
unless directed by OFARR.63  A major concern of the APA’s comprehensive 
1974 revision was providing timely public notice of agency action and 
meetings of public bodies at which dispositive action may or would be taken.  
As of January 2011, the APA required the Department of State to publish 
weekly information pertaining to agency actions online and in print, 
including notices of public hearings, public meetings, rule development, 
filing of proposed rules, adoption of rules, and summaries of rule objections 
filed by the legislative Joint Administrative Procedures Committee.64  As the 
statute allowed neither the governor nor the secretary of state65 to prevent 
such publication, failure to publish could have subjected the department and 
the secretary to legal action. 
C. Impact of EO 11-01 on the Etienne Litigation 
In Etienne the ALJ’s ruling on the motions for summary final order was 
still pending on January 7, 2011, when DCF asserted two grounds to continue 
 
 60  FLA. STAT. § 14.26(2)(a) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 61  FLA. STAT. § 14.2019(4) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 62  FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2011) (emphasis added). 
 63  This is inconsistent with FLA. STAT. §§ 120.55(1)(b), (2) (2011).  The order could have 
been executed in compliance with law through OFARR approving the mandatory weekly 
publication. 
 64  In the 2012 Session the legislature revised the publication requirement.  The electronic 
format is now mandatory, and the publication is called the Florida Administrative Register. 
2012 Fla. Laws 63, § 2; see also FLA. STAT § 120.55 (2018). 
 65  See FLA. STAT. § 20.10(1) (2011).  The Secretary of State is the head of the Department 
of State.  
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the final hearing scheduled for March.  First, the deadline for filing proposed 
changes to the disputed form by the USDA was March 23, and DCF would 
be required to implement the resulting decision.  DCF argued waiting for 
final guidance from the USDA was reasonable, and there was no need for a 
final order prior to that time.66  Second, EO 11-01 suspended current 
rulemaking, and any changes to the form required by the USDA would also 
require OFARR approval before the revised form could be adopted.67 
Etienne opposed a continuance on several grounds.  She argued the 
anticipated USDA review and comment were not relevant to and could not 
moot the pending challenge, which would stand or fall on its own merits.68  
She alleged DCF’s repeated statements of intent to commence rulemaking at 
some unspecified future time were not in themselves good cause for a 
continuance.69  Further, EO 11-01 had no bearing on the consolidated cases 
because DCF demonstrated no attempt to comply with the “seemingly 
innocuous restriction” of requesting OFARR approval to commence 
rulemaking.70  Finally, Etienne argued the governor had no power to suspend 
rulemaking under the APA, and EO 11-01 violated the constitutional 
separation of powers by encroaching on the legislative authority exercised 
by adopting the APA.71 
On January 24, 2011, the ALJ abated the proceedings solely by 
concluding that EO 11-01 suspended rulemaking.72  The ALJ postponed 
further action in the matter until OFARR reviewed the proposed form and 
DCF could proceed with rulemaking.73  A subsequent order on April 20, 
2011, clearly stated the sole basis for the original abatement was to 
accommodate the OFARR review.74  Etienne appealed this non-final order, 
raising, among other points, her argument that EO 11-01 unconstitutionally 
suspended certain agency rulemaking, and requested the appellate court lift 
 
 66  Respondent’s Motion for Continuance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family 
Servs., supra note 51. 
 67  Id. 
 68  Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Motion for Continuance at 2–3, Etienne v. 
Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 12, 
2011). 
 69  Id. at 4. 
 70  Id. at 5. 
 71  Id. at 5–6. 
 72  Order Canceling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children 
and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Jan. 24, 2011). The ALJ did 
note the USDA preliminary review found the proposed revised form still did not comply with 
federal regulations. 
 73  Id.  
 74  Order Continuing Case in Abeyance and Requiring Status Report, Etienne v. Dep’t of 
Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Apr. 20, 2011). 
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the abatement.75  DCF completed the OFARR review process and notified 
the ALJ that the conditions of the abatement were met.76  The ALJ noted the 
abatement could not be lifted while the interlocutory appeal on that issue was 
pending,77 and the appellate court temporarily relinquished jurisdiction so 
the ALJ could act.78  Ultimately, all three cases were dismissed as moot once 
DCF ceased using the challenged form.79 
III. THE ISSUES: PRESENTATION, ARGUMENT, AND ANALYSIS 
A. Point: Whiley and Amici 
Like Etienne, Whiley received food purchase assistance through SNAP, 
and she periodically was required to recertify her need for continuing 
benefits.80  Whiley preferred to use the available online application.81  She 
alleged the online form required more than minimum information to initiate 
the process, in violation of USDA policy,82 similarly being argued in the 
Etienne litigation.  Rather than join the pending administrative challenges to 
the very same rulemaking or bring one of the actions available to try the facts 
fully and obtain direct relief for the alleged violation of her rights,83 Whiley 
petitioned the Florida Supreme Court to issue a writ of quo warranto against 
the governor.84 
 
 75  Administrative Petition to Review Non-Final Agency Action, Etienne v. Dep’t of 
Children and Family Servs., No. 3D11-461 (Feb. 23, 2011).   
 76  Notice that Condition of Order Cancelling Hearing and Placing Cases in Abeyance 
has been Met and Motion for a Status Conference, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family 
Servs., Nos. 10-5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (Apr. 13, 2011). 
 77  Order Continuing Case in Abeyance and Requiring Status Report, supra note 74. 
 78  Order Granting Temporary Relinquishment on Court’s Own Motion, No. 3D11-461 
(May 10, 2011). The ALJ lifted the abatement by order dated May 25, 2011. 
 79  Final Order of Dismissal, Etienne v. Dep’t of Children and Family Servs., Nos. 10-
5141RX, 10-9516RP, 10-10105RP (July 21, 2011). 
 80  65A FLA. ADMIN. CODE R. 1.205(2) (2010). 
 81  Affidavit of Rosalie Whiley incorporated into Appendix to Petition for Writ of Quo 
Warranto, Whiley v. Scott, No. SC11-592 (March 28, 2011).  
 82  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 6.  
 83  For example, Whiley could have alleged the actions of DCF violated her rights as 
secured by the federal laws governing SNAP and brought an action for declaratory and 
injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in U.S. District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2010).  
Alternatively, she could have brought such an action in the applicable Florida Circuit Court, 
as Florida Circuit Courts have all original jurisdiction not otherwise vested by law in the local 
county courts. FLA. CONST. art. V, § 5(b); FLA. STAT. § 26.021.  Finally, she could have sought 
declaratory and injunctive relief under FLA. STAT.  § 86.011.  
 84  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4.  The Florida Supreme Court has 
developed the use of proceedings in quo warranto to test not only whether an individual 
properly occupies a public office, but also whether an officer or agency exercised a proper 
right or power. See Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 2008); 
Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989). 
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The petition alleged that EO 11-01 improperly suspended 
administrative rulemaking because the governor had no such authority.85  
Expanding on the point asserted in Etienne, counsel for Whiley conflated 
narrow readings of two constitutional principles to argue the governor had 
no authority to direct, supervise, or control at-will appointed agency heads 
in the conduct of administrative rulemaking.86  First, the petition correctly 
stated rulemaking is a legislative function and may be delegated to executive 
branch agencies (hence, to the officials of such agencies) only under specific 
restrictions and guidelines.87  However, Whiley went beyond the concept of 
a strict separation of powers in the Florida Constitution by arguing all actions 
pertaining to agency rulemaking, from initial conception to final adoption, 
were solely controlled by the legislature as an exclusively legislative 
power.88  She argued the governor had only such power to direct, supervise, 
or control executive branch agencies and their exercise of delegated 
rulemaking authority as was prescribed by statute, and that the legislature 
made rulemaking the exclusive prerogative of the agency heads.  Because 
they were required to exercise this authority independently, the governor 
could not order any suspension of rulemaking.89 
Whiley’s theory hinged on the constitutional phrase “or an officer or 
board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor . . . .”90  The 
word “or” at the beginning of the constitutional clause could be read as a 
conjunctive, grammatically completing the list of officials from which the 
legislature could choose one alternative to directly administer a particular 
agency.  This reading is consistent with Florida’s historical understanding 
and application of executive power, with prior precedent of the Supreme 
Court, and with the text of the Florida Constitution.  However, citing AGO 
81-49, Whiley applied a disjunctive reading and argued the Constitution 
authorized the legislature to apportion all executive branch power over a 
particular agency function to one of the denominated officials, excluding any 
gubernatorial authority over the agency (with the exception of removing 
those appointees serving at the governor’s pleasure).91  This novel 
interpretation meant the legislature was authorized to create a category of 
state officials who: (1) were appointed by the governor, not elected by the 
people; (2) served at the pleasure of the governor; (3) had the power to 
control the functions of their respective agencies without gubernatorial 
 
 85  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 3. 
 86  Id. at 1–2, 15–16. 
 87  Id. at 17.  
 88  Id. at 12.  
 89  Id. at 11–12. 
 90  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
 91  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 11, 15–16. 
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2019  11:09 AM 
2019] WHILEY V. SCOTT 13 
direction or supervision; and thus (4) were not amenable to gubernatorial 
direction to follow a particular policy when implementing the laws within 
the jurisdiction of their particular agencies.  By implication, Whiley posited 
the legislature statutorily allotted certain executive branch functions beyond 
the direction, supervision, or control of the governor and every elected 
officer.  The governor’s authority to remove an at-will appointee therefore 
was irrelevant to the supervision and control of a program placed under such 
an agency head.  Whiley acknowledged that Article IV, section 1(a), vested 
supreme executive power in the governor but dismissed its relevance by 
arguing this section conferred neither the power to suspend the operation of 
a statute nor the authority of direct control over agency rulemaking, absent 
an express grant from the legislature.92  Essentially, Whiley argued that in 
delegating rulemaking authority the legislature co-opted the assigned official 
to the exclusion of the executive power vested in the governor. 
The petition included some collateral issues.  She alleged the 
designation of OFARR in EO 11-01 created a new state agency to which the 
governor transferred the rulemaking authority statutorily vested in the 
agency heads.93  A plain reading of the order showed the governor acted 
under his authority to designate an operational function within the EOG and 
to delegate the oversight necessary to supervise and control certain 
administrative agency functions.  Whiley’s argument was spurious.  The 
name of the office was thus irrelevant insofar as it denoted those employees 
of EOG tasked with duties in support of the governor’s exercise of an 
oversight function.94 
Whiley also argued that requiring OFARR approval, before “governor-
directed” agencies could proceed with rulemaking, effectively transferred 
the ultimate decision to propose and adopt rules to OFARR.95  She contended 
this violated the separation of powers and deprived the public of the 
procedural safeguards in the APA.96  This issue is interesting because she 
began by correctly stating part of EO 11-01 improperly attempted to abrogate 
the statute by ordering a suspension of all rulemaking publication, but then 
speculated the APA would be flagrantly violated if administrative agencies 
complied with the order.97  Whiley failed to show EO 11-01 actually 
compelled or encouraged any agency to violate the APA.98  She could only 
 
 92  Id. at 11–12. 
 93  Id. at 2–5, 16, 18, 21.   
 94  Just as easily, the Governor could have called this office “Bob” without any change in 
its assigned function. 
 95  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 21–24. 
 96  Id.  at 14–18.   
 97  Id. at 26. 
 98  The exception previously noted affected publication of notices in the Florida 
Administrative Weekly, a statutory requirement that could have been satisfied by timely 
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show where agencies relied on EO 11-01 as justifying their own suspensions 
of rulemaking.99 
This argument demonstrated the irreconcilable paradox in Whiley’s 
position.  If the speculative violations of the APA could occur only because 
agencies chose to comply with EO 11-01, the governor had no inherent 
authority to order any suspension and the agencies were free to choose to 
proceed with the statutory requirements of the APA.  Thus, the petition was 
not well-taken because the proper remedy was against the DCF officials who 
declined to conduct timely rulemaking.100  However, if the governor’s 
directive bound agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees, 
whether issued as a formal executive order or communicated less formally, 
the petition in quo warranto was not well-taken because the governor acted 
according to a valid power.  The proper remedy then would be an action in 
circuit court challenging the suspension.101 
After various amici filed briefs and the governor filed his response, 
Whiley’s amended reply attempted to reinforce her major argument through 
an inverted interpretation of the Florida Constitution.  She asserted the 
governor’s powers were limited to those expressly “spelled out in the 
Constitution or statutes,” and, despite the express vesting of executive power 
in Article IV, section 1(a), the governor’s power over state agencies was 
“limited to whatever the Constitution and the statutes grant him.”102  This 
construction directly conflicted with the clear language and intent of Article 
IV, section 1(a), vesting the people’s executive power in the governor, 
subject to express limitations, rather than the inverse—a grant only of 
specifically expressed powers.  Whiley’s appeal to history—”[t]he Governor 
has taken extraordinary action beyond that of any previous governor and an 
extraordinary writ is necessary”103—even if allowed as rhetorical license, 
cannot substantiate such hyperbole when considered in light of Florida’s 
historical implementation of executive power.104 
The court granted leave to file briefs as amicus curiae to three entities 
supporting Whiley.105  Reiterating her primary points, each amicus 
 
OFARR action. 
 99  Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 27–28. 
 100  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(a) (requiring an agency to adopt a rule “as soon as 
feasible and practicable.”); see also FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a) (expressly requiring the agency 
head to approve providing the statutory notice of rulemaking.).   
 101  See Martinez v. Martinez, 545 So. 2d 1338, 1339 (Fla. 1989).  Other issues raised in 
the original petition were derivative or duplicative of the main arguments considered by the 
court. 
 102  Petitioner’s Amended Reply, at 4, 15, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. 
SC11-592). 
 103  Id. at 30. 
 104  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–351.  
 105  Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v. 
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advocated the analysis of AGO 81-49 and argued the placing of 
administrative departments under appointed agency heads, pursuant to 
Article IV, section 6, precluded the governor from exercising any 
supervision or control over the rulemaking functions of those agencies.106  
Each amicus argued EO 11-01 was an attempt to usurp the rulemaking 
authority delegated by the legislature, violating the separation of powers 
doctrine.107 
The Florida Audubon Society argued the governor’s supreme executive 
power did not inherently include the authority to control all executive 
agencies, because Article IV, section 1(a), expressly authorized the governor 
to “require information in writing from all executive or administrative state, 
county or municipal officers upon any subject relating to the duties of their 
respective offices.”108  If the governor had inherent constitutional power to 
direct executive branch officers, Florida Audubon posited there would have 
been no need to spell out this particular power.109  Therefore, the vested 
executive power did not imply any additional authority over executive 
agencies beyond that specified in the Constitution or established by 
statute.110  This argument fails on a clear reading of the entire text of Article 
IV, section 1(a). 
The Constitution authorizes the governor to require written information 
from all officers and entities of the executive branch, including separately 
elected officers such as the Commissioner of Agriculture, separate 
constitutional entities such as the Fish and Wildlife Conservation 
Commission, and executives of county or municipal governments.111  
Because the Constitution places these officers and entities outside the 
governor’s general authority, such express exception to this alternate 
allocation of executive power was necessary for the governor to require all 
 
Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592); Brief for Disability Rights Florida as 
Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-
592); Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law Section of the 
Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 
2011) (No. SC11-592). 
 106  Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
105, at 6; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 105, at 4–5; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law 
Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 3–4.   
 107  Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
105, at 10; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra 
note 105, at 3-5; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law Attorneys and the Elder Law Section 
of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 2–3.   
 108  Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
105, at 6–7.   
 109  Id. at 6. 
 110  Id. at 6–7.  
 111  See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 4(d), 9; FLA. CONST. art. VIII, §§ 1, 2.   
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such officers to provide written information.  Granting the governor 
authority over other officers does not imply a lack of inherent authority over 
the governor’s own at-will subordinate appointees. 
Another amicus argued policy considerations, some outside the scope 
of a quo warranto petition.112  Disability Rights Florida argued the governor 
should not be “allowed” to “exercise ultimate discretion” over rulemaking 
because that would presume a subject matter expertise he did not possess.113  
The flaw in this argument is that Article IV sets no criteria or qualifications 
for individuals chosen to head agencies or serve on licensing boards.  Where 
particular expertise is necessary, both the Constitution and statutes expressly 
state the required qualifications.114 
B. Counterpoint: The Governor and The Attorney General 
1. Executive Order 11-72 
The governor filed a formal response to the petition on May 12, 2011, 
but the actual response began more than a month before with the 
promulgation of Executive Order 11-72 (“EO 11-72”),115 expressly 
superseding EO 11-01.  The preamble of EO 11-72 incorporated many of the 
policy statements set out in EO 11-01, recited OFARR’s achievements, and 
reiterated key provisions of Article IV, sections 1(a) and 6.116  EO 11-72 
differed by eliminating the suspension of both agency rulemaking and 
publication by the Department of State.117  The order confirmed the utility of 
OFARR and continued its delegation of authority to review and approve 
prospective rules, without renewing its earlier duties to investigate agency 
 
 112  Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
105, at 7–8.  
 113  Id. at 8. 
 114  The attorney general must meet the same basic constitutional requirements for office 
as the governor and other cabinet members but also must be a licensed attorney in Florida for 
the 5 years preceding election to office. FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.  When necessary, the 
legislature expressly states the specific qualifications to head certain agencies, such as the 
director of the Office of Insurance Regulation. FLA. STAT. § 20.121(3)(d) (2018). 
 115  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72 (April 8, 2011). 
 116  FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6. 
 117  As noted in the discussion of EO 11-01, part of that order would have required the 
Secretary of State to violate the clear requirements of FLA. STAT. § 120.55 (2010).  The 
Department of State in fact published the Florida Administrative Weekly on January 7, 2011.  
Due to the timing of publication requirements, that publication was already in process when 
EO 11-01 was issued and could not be “suspended.”  The department complied with the order 
and did not publish an issue on January 14, 2011.  Publication resumed on January 21, 2011, 
apparently because the department had an opportunity to confer with the governor’s office 
and clarify the statute’s mandate on weekly publication. See Florida Administative Code and 
Florida Administrative Register, FLA. DEPT. OF STATE (last visited Nov. 27, 2018),  
https://www.flrules.org/bigDoc/Default.asp?Year=2011. 
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fraud and mismanagement.118  The order continued to call for a 
comprehensive review of all existing rules and to repeal those that were 
duplicative, unnecessary, or obsolete.119 
Because the governor issued EO 11-72 after Whiley filed her petition, 
the order’s preamble stated the “administering, planning, and budgeting for 
the State is inextricably intertwined with the agency rulemaking process,” 
anticipating the court’s central focus on the role of gubernatorial oversight 
of agency rulemaking.120  This finding foreshadowed the governor’s central 
argument before the court: to give full effect to the plain language in Article 
IV, the governor has broad authority to meet his responsibilities, and this 
authority inherently resides in the comprehensive, plenary executive power 
vested by the people.121  Unless a facet of executive authority is expressly 
placed by the Constitution in another official or entity, the full executive 
power remains with the governor pursuant to Article IV, section 1(a).  Under 
this interpretation, Article IV, section 6, authorizes the legislature to organize 
the executive branch in a standardized fashion for management purposes, 
removing the overarching organizational authority from the governor and 
cabinet.  However, the section does not authorize the legislature to apportion 
executive power in any manner that dilutes the authority expressly vested in 
the constitutional executive officers. 
2. The Governor’s Response to the Petition 
Counsel for the governor faced a classic dilemma in crafting the 
response.  On one hand, the historical understanding and implementation of 
executive branch power in Florida, as well as other states and the federal 
government, clearly refuted Whiley’s argument that the governor lacked 
authority over appointed at-will agency heads, other than the power of 
removal.122  There was no basis for the case and apparently no advantage for 
the governor to acquiesce and participate in the proceeding.  In fact, 
addressing the merits of the petition could arguably be deemed as seeking an 
advisory opinion from the Supreme Court about the governor’s 
constitutional powers.123  On the other hand, not participating and opposing 
the petition risked the court issuing a writ on arguably invalid grounds, even 
though the court had neither asserted personal jurisdiction over the 
 
 118  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, at § 3. 
 119  Id. at § 6.   
 120  Id. at § 2.  
 121  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, at 35, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 
(Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592).  
 122  Id. at 35–50. 
 123  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c) (“The governor may request in writing the opinion of the 
justices of the supreme court as to the interpretation of any portion of this constitution upon 
any question affecting the governor’s executive powers and duties.”).  
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governor124 nor possessed the means to enforce any resulting order.  Ignoring 
such a writ could precipitate a public opinion maelstrom fueled by incendiary 
media commentary, since the decision would likely be issued in the summer, 
a traditionally slow news time in Florida save for the occasional tropical 
cyclonic event.  Choosing to respond, the governor raised the proper and 
valid historical, precedential, and constitutional grounds to dismiss the 
petition but also overextended some of those very points.125 
The response argued three overarching themes.  First, relief through 
quo warranto was not appropriate because Whiley had legal remedies 
readily available if there was a true violation of the APA.126  Many of her 
arguments or those by her amici were based on hypothetical transgressions 
of the APA, not actual facts.127  Their arguments about OFARR only 
amounted to policy challenges for which the APA itself provided ample 
avenues for relief, far from showing a constitutional crisis precipitated by 
EO 11-01.128  Second, challenging OFARR as the vehicle through which the 
governor implemented a program of administrative oversight, did not raise a 
separation of powers issue because the exercise of intra-branch authority did 
not create an inter-branch conflict.129  Each valid legislative delegation of 
rulemaking authority necessarily required the executive branch to exercise 
some discretion in adopting rules.130  Properly exercising such discretion 
incorporated the fact that appointed agency heads were not autonomous but 
deferred to the guidance and policies of the governor.  Third, whether by 
executive order or informal communication, the constitutional powers vested 
and duties imposed under Article IV provided ample authority for 
gubernatorial oversight of certain executive departments, as demonstrated by 
Florida’s long history of gubernatorial direction of agencies and 
rulemaking.131 
Arguing that debatable policy choices are no basis for an exercise of 
quo warranto jurisdiction, the governor characterized the petition as nothing 
 
 124  See Order-Response/Reply Requested (Spec. Issue), Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 
(Fla. 2011) (No. SC11-592). Rather than issue a summons or other attempt to compel the 
appearance of the governor, on April 4, 2011, the Supreme Court issued a request for the 
governor to respond to the petition and briefs of amicus by April 25, 2011.  
 125  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121.  
 126  Id. at 24–25.  
 127  Id. at 12–14; Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, supra note 105, at 2, 11–13; Brief for Disability Rights Florida as Amicus Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, supra note 105, at 8–12; Brief for Academy of Florida Elder Law 
Attorneys and the Elder Law Section of the Florida Bar as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner, supra note 105, at 4–6.  
 128  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 28–29. 
 129  Id. at 27.   
 130  Id. at 26. 
 131  Id. at 30–46.  
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more than a mere collection of alleged violations of the APA for which the 
Act itself provided complete process and remedies.132  In fact, the APA does 
not even apply to executive orders issued pursuant to the governor’s 
constitutional authority.133  However, this argument left open the question of 
how to resolve issues of legislative authority under Article IV, section 6.  The 
remedies available under the APA could not address whether a statute, which 
placed a department under the direct administration of a non-elected agency 
head appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, made that 
bureaucrat constitutionally autonomous from any gubernatorial direction and 
supervision until removed from office.  Questions about the governor’s 
constitutional power are outside the scope of the APA and cannot be 
adjudicated in an administrative challenge.134  Conversely, a declaratory 
judgment action filed in the appropriate Florida Circuit Court could 
appropriately challenge any rulemaking done pursuant to allegedly 
unauthorized gubernatorial direction or an act taken in contravention of such 
direction.135 
On the merits, the governor stated the creation of OFARR within the 
EOG did not violate the separation of powers doctrine because OFARR was 
not a new administrative agency.136  Derived solely from the governor’s 
authority over his own staff, OFARR exercised no power expressly allotted 
by the Constitution or delegated by statute.137  OFARR’s review and 
approval of certain rulemaking decisions did not improperly revise the APA, 
but was instead a structured internal process chosen by the governor to 
supervise those agencies headed by appointees serving at his pleasure.138  
OFARR’s supervision of agency rulemaking was derived only from the 
governor’s existing authority.139  This “intra-branch authority” to direct 
agency heads in their duties—including administrative rulemaking—in turn 
was rooted in the governor’s power to remove certain agency heads at will.  
The “power to remove is the power to control.”140 
Each agency authorized to implement substantive law through 
 
 132  Id. at 25.  
 133  See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1) (2016). 
 134  Myers v. Hawkins, 362 So. 2d 926, 928 (Fla. 1978). 
 135  FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (2016). The clear advantages of such a proceeding include not 
only the ability to develop a complete factual record but also opportunity for advocates to 
fully develop the legal arguments before the trial court, with further refinement in the Florida 
intermediate appellate courts. Such refinement of the arguments and the record would better 
assist the Supreme Court in resolving any remaining issues requiring its attention. 
 136  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 6, 31. 
 137  Id. at 6–8, 30–32.   
 138  Id. at 32–33, 50–56.   
 139  Id. at 21–23.   
 140  Id. at 33. 
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rulemaking must comply with the express limitations and guidance in the 
governing statute, using the process required by the APA.141  Within these 
statutory parameters, the agency makes a number of policy choices before 
rulemaking is complete, from initial internal decisions about the wording of 
the proposed rule through deciding whether to revise the text before final 
adoption.  Some rulemaking tasks must be done only by each agency head,142 
but this procedural requirement does not alter the relationship between the 
governor and the agency head.  Contrary to Whiley’s contention, at-will 
appointees are not autonomous from gubernatorial control.  With the sole 
power to remove appointed agency heads serving at his pleasure, the 
governor has the authority and responsibility to direct these appointees about 
the policy choices that would result in retention or removal.143  By ignoring 
this principle, Whiley and supportive amici effectively read Article IV, 
section 1(a) out of the Constitution. 
The governor argued that Whiley’s own rationale proved the petition 
should be denied, noting that if his order actually controlled the exercise of 
rulemaking authority by at-will appointed agency heads, the case was moot, 
and the court could not issue the writ because the governor exercised a valid 
constitutional power.144  However, assuming arguendo the agency heads 
were autonomous, the petition was also moot because the agency heads could 
choose to ignore the order and avoid the adverse impacts speculated by 
Whiley.145  If agency heads voluntarily choose to comply with the executive 
order and submit rulemaking decisions to the OFARR process, any 
violations of the APA flowed from that choice, making the agency heads the 
proper parties in any challenge.146 
Additionally, arguing against the merits of the petition, the governor 
referred to the numerous executive orders by prior Florida governors 
expressly directing and controlling agency rulemaking, as evidence of the 
historical understanding of the authority vested through the express language 
of Article IV, section 1.147  In conjunction with the other terms in section 
 
 141  FLA. STAT. § 120.536(1) (2018). 
 142  See FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(k) (2018). For example, the agency head must approve the 
notice of proposed rule required by FLA. STAT. § 120.54(3)(a)1.  
 143  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32 n. 13, 58.  
 144  Id. at 30–32.   
 145  The governor’s argument tacitly acknowledged that an executive order does not have 
the force of law, unlike a properly enacted bill which the governor approves.  See FLA. CONST. 
art.  III, §§ 6–8.  The legislature by statute has authorized certain declarations of the governor 
as having the force of law. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 14.021 (2018) (promulgation and 
enforcement of rules and regulations during a lawfully declared emergency); § 501.160(2) 
(2018) (selling essential commodities for an unconscionable price during a declared state of 
emergency, or “price gouging”). 
 146  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32 n.13.  
 147  Id. at 41–46.   
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1(a), the duty to ensure faithful execution of the laws implied a broad scope 
for the executive power because the court’s own precedents found proper 
performance of this duty was essential to the orderly conduct of 
government.148  The governor asserted this interpretation aligned with the 
positions of the federal government and the majority of states.149  Pointing to 
the statute that created the Chief Inspector General’s duties in the EOG, the 
governor’s argument noted the legislature recognized the authority of the 
governor over those executive branch agencies for which direct 
administration was placed in an at-will appointee.150  Finally, the governor 
pointed out the inconsistency of Whiley and the amici urging their position 
to preserve public reliance on agency head “expertise” in formulating agency 
rules—an expertise the governor did not have—while concurrently arguing 
against any executive branch discretion in implementing delegated 
rulemaking.151  As the governor established earlier in his response, only 
exercising the discretion inherent in delegated rulemaking authority 
demonstrates this “expertise.”152 
The governor’s argument correctly applied the historical interpretation 
of executive power vested by the Florida Constitution.  Reaching as far back 
as Hamilton’s observation on the necessity for vigor in the executive 
branch,153 and Madison’s summation about the centrality of “appointing, 
overseeing, and controlling those who execute the laws,”154 the governor’s 
response argued the historical separation of powers in American 
constitutionalism continued to inform interpretations about the nature and 
extent of executive power.155  The governor argued that the longstanding 
practices of chief executives over time became part of the structure of 
government and a meaningful interpretation of the vested executive 
power.156  Building on this premise, the governor read the provisions of 
Article IV, sections 1 and 6 together.  The governor applied the court’s 
precedents on constitutional interpretation to establish the clear and orderly 
authority for directing and supervising the exercise of delegated rulemaking 
 
 148  Id. at 38–39 (citing In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 290 So. 2d 473, 475 (Fla. 
1974); Finch v. Fitzpatrick, 254 So. 2d 203, 204 (Fla. 1971)). 
 149  Id. at 46, 49. 
 150  FLA. STAT. § 14.32(2)(d), (i) (2011) (authorizing the Chief Inspector General both to 
examine records of “any agency the administration of which is under the direct supervision 
of the Governor,” and to act as liaison and monitor of inspectors general “in the agencies 
under the Governor’s jurisdiction.”). 
 151  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 64.   
 152  Id. at 64.  
 153  Id. at 65 (quoting from THE FEDERALIST No. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)). 
 154  Id. at 37 (quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 481 (1789). 
 155  Id. at 53–54.   
 156  Id. at 46 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 
(1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
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authority by at-will appointees.157  Thus, the governor answered the petition 
by demonstrating the power he had in the first place.158 
The court declined to dismiss the petition on jurisdictional grounds or 
in the interest of judicial prudence.  Even so, the governor could have 
obviated any further discussion about deferring to agency expertise by noting 
the sparing use of express qualifications for officials in both the Constitution 
and statute.  The Constitution clearly states when “special expertise” is a 
prerequisite to take office,159 and the legislature expressly limits certain 
agency heads to particular qualifications.160  As most offices do not require 
particular expertise or training in a field prior to an official’s election or 
appointment, Whiley and her amici’s reliance on this point was misplaced 
and of little relevance. 
3. The Attorney General’s Amicus Curiae Brief Supporting the 
Governor 
The Attorney General’s amicus brief focused on the state’s substantial 
interest in preserving the proper authority over executive branch agencies, 
vested in elected officers who are directly accountable to the voters, refuting 
Whiley’s theory of independently-operating agency heads.161  The Attorney 
General argued the unique facts underlying AGO 81-49 rendered its 
rationale unpersuasive in this case.162  AGO 81-49 failed to address the 
constitutional vesting of supreme executive power in the governor in the 
context of the governor’s responsibility to supervise executive branch 
agencies.163  Further, subsequent developments in the Constitution and the 
law made this opinion irrelevant.164 
The amicus brief complemented the governor’s argument—the powers 
vested and duties imposed in Article IV, section 1, establish the broad scope 
of the executive power to control administrative agencies headed by at-will 
 
 157  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32–41.   
 158  Id.  
 159  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 5(b) (providing that the Attorney General must be a member of 
the Florida Bar for at least 5 years preceding election to office, but suggesting there is no 
similar requirement for skill or training imposed on the Governor, Chief Financial Officer, or 
Commissioner of Agriculture.). 
 160  See FLA. STAT. § 20.43(2)(a) (2018) (stating that the State Surgeon General must be a 
licensed doctor with “advanced training or extensive experience” in public health 
administration); see also FLA. STAT. § 20.23(1)(b) (2018) (specific education and experience 
relevant to transportation systems is required for the Secretary of the Department of 
Transportation). 
 161  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General in Support of Respondent, supra note 35, at 1.  
 162  Id. at 15. 
 163  Id. at 16. 
 164  Id. at 17. 
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gubernatorial appointees.165  An interpretation finding that these appointees 
exercise authority, independent from any direction of the governor, fails to 
comport with the constitutional principles establishing political 
accountability in the governor for the actions of administrative agencies.166  
Such an interpretation implies a diffusion of executive power beyond the 
limitations expressly stated in the Constitution, precluding the ability of the 
voters to hold anyone accountable for agency action.167  Because the 
governor was acting under proper constitutional authority, absent a clear 
violation of law, separation of powers principles called for judicial 
deference, and the court was urged to refrain from reviewing and second-
guessing the governor’s use of OFARR to implement his policies regarding 
agency rulemaking.168 
Interestingly, the Attorney General flatly stated reliance on AGO 81-49 
was “unwarranted,” and argued three points, all but receding from the 
previously-dormant opinion.169  First, the facts of the opinion were 
inapposite to the pending petition.  The Attorney General’s unrebutted 
summary of those facts showed that the governor in 1981 sought to exercise 
complete control over every aspect of agency compliance, implementation, 
and enforcement of the Coastal Management Program, effectively co-opting 
the entire rulemaking function.170  In contrast, EO 11-01 imposed a clearly 
restrained supervision of rulemaking done by gubernatorial appointees;171 
there was no usurpation of the requirements in the APA.  Second, in 1992, 
the people increased the scope of the governor’s authority over state agencies 
by amending article IV, section 1(a), to add the final clause: “[t]he governor 
shall be the chief administrative officer of the state responsible for the 
planning and budgeting for the state . . . ,” creating a different constitutional 
context that effectively distinguished AGO 81-49.172  Third, statutory 
changes subsequent to AGO 81-49 further limited any relevance of the 
opinion.173  In short, the Attorney General argued AGO 81-49 was an 
anachronism with no current utility.174 
 
 165  Id. at 4–8; see Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 35–
36, 38–41.   
 166  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 5.  
 167  Id. at 6. 
 168  Id. at 10–11. 
 169  Id. at 15–17. 
 170  Id. at 15. 
 171  Id. at 15–16. 
 172  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 16–17. 
 173  Id. at 16–17. See FLA. STAT. § 20.051 (2018), created by 1994 Fla. Laws 235 § 5. 
 174  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 17. 
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IV. THE MAJORITY OPINION AND THE DISSENTS 
Five Justices175 concurred in a per curiam opinion granting the petition 
but withholding the requested writ.176  The majority viewed the case as a 
question on the respective authorities of the governor and the legislature 
concerning agency rulemaking proceedings: 
Our precise task in this case is to decide whether the Governor has 
overstepped his constitutional authority by issuing executive 
orders which contain certain limitations and suspensions upon 
agencies relating to their delegated legislative rulemaking 
authority and the requirements related thereto.177 
The majority concluded the governor lacked authority to issue EO 11-
01 and its successor, EO 11-72, on separation of powers grounds: 
“[T]o the extent each suspends and terminates rulemaking by 
precluding notice publication and other compliance with Chapter 
120 absent prior approval from OFARR—contrary to the 
Administrative Procedure Act—(the orders) infringe upon the 
very process of rulemaking and encroach upon the Legislature’s 
delegation of its rulemaking power as set forth in the Florida 
Statutes.”178  
The majority emphasized two concepts urged by Whiley.  First, the 
suspension of pending rulemaking by EO 11-01 and creation of the OFARR 
review process altered the rulemaking procedure of the APA, violating the 
constitutional separation of powers.179  Second, the governor could only 
control rulemaking where the legislature placed the direct administration of 
an agency under his authority.180  Essentially, the majority interpreted both 
orders as unauthorized, binding statutory amendments.  Further, the majority 
creatively read article IV, section 6, as allowing the legislature to create a 
category of subordinate executive branch officials, composed of appointed 
agency heads serving at the pleasure of the governor.181  Under the majority’s 
decision, these appointed agency heads apparently are empowered to 
exercise the authority of their respective agencies independently and without 
 
 175  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (per curiam). Justices Barbara J. Pariente, 
R. Fred Lewis, Peggy A. Quince, Jorge Labarga, and James E.C. Perry joined this opinion. 
See Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 717 (Fla. 2011). 
 176  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 702 (Polston, J., dissenting) (stating that by reaching a conclusion 
but declining to issue any relief, the majority’s decision appeared to be more in the nature of 
an advisory opinion under FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(c)); see also id. at 726. The Constitution 
gives the court discretion whether to issue the writ, and the court adopted a similar outcome 
in Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008). 
 177  Id. at 708. 
 178  Id. at 713 (emphasis in original). 
 179  Id. at 705.   
 180  Id. at 715–716. 
 181  See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
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any direction or supervision by the governor.182 
The dissenting justices refuted the majority’s presumptions based on 
the actual language in the Florida Constitution, the statutes, and the 
governor’s orders.183  Chief Justice Canady emphasized the traditional 
reading of the Constitution and observed that Florida law imposes no 
restriction on the authority of the governor to supervise and direct policy 
choices made by subordinate executive branch officials regarding 
rulemaking: 
[T]he majority . . . [imposes] unprecedented and unwarranted 
restrictions on the Governor’s constitutional authority to supervise 
subordinate executive branch officers . . . . The majority’s 
decision does not take seriously [the] reality that the rulemaking 
process involves certain discretionary policy choices by executive 
branch officers . . . . Nor does the majority come to terms with the 
absence from Florida law of any restriction on the authority of the 
Governor to supervise and control such policy choices made by 
subordinate executive branch officials with respect to 
rulemaking . . . . The Governor’s right to exercise such 
supervision and control flows from the ‘supreme executive 
power’ . . . together with the Governor’s power . . . to appoint 
executive department heads who serve at the Governor’s 
pleasure . . . . Given the constitutional structure establishing the 
power and responsibilities of the Governor, it is unjustified to 
conclude . . . that by assigning rulemaking power to agency heads, 
the Legislature implicitly divested the Governor of his supervisory 
power with respect to executive officials who serve at his 
pleasure.184 
Justice Polston agreed that “nothing in the APA prohibits the Governor 
from performing executive oversight to ensure that the rulemaking process 
at his agencies results in effective and efficient rules that accord with Florida 
law.”185  He questioned the efficacy of proceeding in quo warranto since the 
original order was superseded, and only hypothetical allegations about the 
substance and effect of EO 11-72 remained.186  He particularly examined the 
APA rulemaking procedure and the changes allegedly wrought by the 
governor’s orders.  Observing that  rulemaking under the APA is a complex 
but flexible process allowing for agency discretion and providing public 
participation, he concluded the governor could implement EO 11-72 without 
 
 182  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 714–15. 
 183  Id. at 717–26 (Fla. 2011). 
 184  Id. at 717–18 (Canady, C.J., dissenting). 
 185  Id. at 724 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 186  Id. at 718 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
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violating the law.187  The governor did not attempt to suspend statutory time 
limits for rulemaking; contrary to the assertions of Whiley and her amici, 
and the conclusions of the majority, “[a]ll agencies remain subject to the 
APA’s time limits, and the Governor remains constitutionally responsible 
for ensuring that Florida’s laws, including the APA’s time limits, are 
faithfully executed by the agencies under his supervision.”188 
V. WHILEY V. SCOTT: AN ANALYSIS 
The dissenting Justices were correct.  By presuming a violation of the 
APA, accepting as true Whiley’s unsubstantiated suppositions, and 
considering only parts of the Florida Constitution without the full context 
supplied by article IV, the majority neatly circumscribed their analysis.  This 
narrow frame made the rationale of AGO 81-49 appear plausible, leading the 
majority to conclude that the governor could neither suspend rulemaking 
within agencies nor direct the rulemaking policies of at-will appointed 
agency heads because the legislature never created such positive authority.189  
Based on Florida’s historical understanding and implementation of 
constitutional executive power, the court’s own precedents, and the full text 
of the Constitution, the majority was wrong. 
A. The Majority Erroneously Presumed Some Abrogation or Violation 
of the APA 
Since Florida’s admission into the Union in 1845, every version of the 
Florida Constitution required the strict separation of powers between the 
three branches.190  “Strict” in the sense that no branch may delegate the whole 
of its power for any purpose to another branch, nor may a branch presume to 
exercise a power clearly belonging to another.  This separation, however, is 
not absolute, and permits the legislature to delegate rulemaking to executive 
branch agencies.191  The separation of powers is applied practically, allowing 
each branch to check and balance the others by zealously guarding its own 
authority, preventing any one branch from exercising complete sovereign 
power, and simultaneously forcing all branches to act in concert to operate a 
workable government.  Through this doctrine, Florida fulfills the basic 
understanding of the U.S. Constitution: 
 
 187  Id. at 725 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 188  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 725. 
 189  Id. at 715–17. 
 190  See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 2 (1838); FLA. CONST. art. III (1868); FLA. CONST. art. II 
(1885); FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3 (1968). 
 191  Bush v. Schiavo, 885 So. 2d 321, 332 (Fla. 2004); State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 
47 So. 969 (Fla. 1908). See also Askew v. Cross Key Waterways, 372 So. 2d 913 (Fla. 1979); 
Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharm., 982 So. 2d 26 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2008). 
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The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and 
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its 
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn 
from context.  While the Constitution diffuses power the better to 
secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the 
dispersed powers into a workable government.  It enjoins upon its 
branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but 
reciprocity.192 
In Florida, the separation of powers is not absolute because not every 
governmental activity belongs exclusively to a single branch: “[t]here has 
been no complete and definite designation by a paramount authority of all 
the particular powers that appertain to each of the several departments.193  
Perhaps there can be no absolute and complete separation of all the powers 
of a practical government.”194  Because the Florida Constitution vests, then 
limits, the entire power allocated to each branch, the text does not express 
the exact parameters, scope, or details of each constituent authority 
comprising such vested power.195  The power is absolute where no limitation 
is expressed.196 
The actual issue in Whiley was not whether the governor encroached on 
the wholly, non-delegable legislative power to enact law.  Rather, the issue 
was whether under proper delegations of rulemaking authority already made 
by the legislature, the governor had constitutional authority to supervise the 
execution of rulemaking by at-will, appointed executive branch 
subordinates.197  Rulemaking is a legislative function, delegable only with 
sufficient guidelines and strictures to prevent the executive branch from 
exercising unbridled discretion to make binding public policy or law.198  The 
majority referred to these principles in their analysis: 
Rulemaking is a derivative of lawmaking . . . . Accordingly, 
‘[w]hen an agency promulgates a rule having the force of law, it 
acts in place of the legislature’ . . . . Moreover, the Legislature has 
delegated specific responsibilities to agency heads, such as the 
 
 192  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
 193  State v. Johnson, 345 So. 2d 1069, 1071 (Fla. 1977). 
 194  State v. Atlantic Coast L. R. Co., 47 So. 969, 975 (Fla. 1908). 
 195   Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011); Graham v. Haridopolos, 75 So. 3d 
315, 318–19 (Fla. 2011); Sullivan v. Askew, 348 So. 2d 312, 315 (Fla. 1977); Corcoran v. 
Geffen, 250 So. 3d 779, 783–84 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018).   
 196  State ex rel. Kennedy v. Lee, 274 So. 2d 881, 882 (Fla. 1973), State ex rel. West v. 
Butler, 69 So. 771, 777 (Fla. 1915).   
 197  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 717–18 (Fla. 2011) (Canady, C.J. dissenting). 
 198  See Sloban v. Fla. Bd. of Pharm., 982 So. 2d 26, 29–30 (Fla. 2008); Bd. of Trustees of 
the Internal Improvement Trust Fund v. Day Cruise Ass’n, 794 So. 2d 696, 704 (Fla. 2001); 
Southwest Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Save the Manatee Club, Inc., 773 So. 2d 594 (Fla. 2000). 
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authority to determine whether to go forward with proposing, 
amending, repealing, or adopting rules . . . . Accordingly, the 
Legislature may specifically delegate, to some extent, its 
rulemaking authority to the executive branch ‘to permit 
administration of legislative policy by an agency with the 
expertise and flexibility needed to deal with complex and fluid 
conditions.’199 
The majority concluded the suspension of rulemaking by EO 11-01, 
applicable to those agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees, 
violated the APA.200  In reaching this conclusion, the majority determined 
that the order made legally-binding changes to the rulemaking statutes, an 
interpretation supported neither by facts in the record nor the order itself. If 
the governor expressly attempted to unilaterally alter the statute, all seven 
justices likely would have joined a single, succinct opinion upholding the 
court’s established precedent.  Under such circumstances, the court may have 
easily found the governor had no authority to enter a binding order modifying 
the law.201 
Whether EO 11-72 actually superseded and replaced EO 11-01 was 
insignificant to the majority.202  EO 11-72 continued to require that specific 
agencies obtain OFARR review and approval prior to publishing any 
rulemaking notice mandated by the APA.203 
The majority concluded the directives in EO 11-01 and EO 11-72204 
effectively altered the statute, usurping legislative power.205  As noted by 
Justice Polston in his dissent, the APA is silent on the process applicable to 
formulating policy prior to initiating statutory rulemaking, especially how, 
when, where, and with whom an agency conducts such initial creation.206  
The court agreed with the governor’s argument that the governor may 
consult with agencies headed by his or her at-will appointees during this 
period of formulation.207  Here, the only potential conflict between EO 11-
 
 199  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 710–11.  
 200  Id. at 713.   
 201  See, e.g., Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008). 
 202  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 719 (Polston, J., dissenting) (explaining that EO 11-72 by its own 
terms “superseded” the earlier order, which overrode EO 11-01 and mooted any challenge to 
it). Fla. Executive Order No. 2011-72, § 8 (Apr. 8, 2011) clearly states the order supersedes 
EO 11-01.  The phrasing used by the majority opinion seems to indicate that some retained 
vitality in EO 11-01 was necessary for the case to continue.  
 203  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, § 1.  
 204  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, § 1; Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra 
note 115, § 1. 
 205  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713. 
 206   Id. at 721 (Polston, J., dissenting); see also Adam Smith Enters. v. State Dept. of 
Envtl. Regulation, 553 So. 2d 1260, 1265 n. 4 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990). 
 207  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715–16; see also Oral Argument at 46:35, 57:15, 1:12:29–1:13:02, 
Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC 11-592). 
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01 and the APA was the direction for the Secretary of State not to publish 
rulemaking notices without prior OFARR approval.  Since the governor 
cannot order anyone to act illegally without violating his or her own 
constitutional duty to ensure faithful execution of the laws, that portion of 
EO 11-01 was void ab initio, unless OFARR “directed” weekly publication 
as required at that time. 
The terms of both orders, the text of the APA, and the lack of any 
sufficient facts on the record demonstrated the orders created no actual, 
enforceable suspension of rulemaking in derogation of law.  Nonetheless, the 
court accepted Whiley’s errant view that agencies may hold and exercise 
rulemaking authority independent from the direction or supervision of the 
governor or any other elected constitutional officer.208  EO 11-01 suspended 
prospective and pending rulemaking until the governor’s delegate could 
review and approve the agency proposals.209  Moreover, EO 11-72 required 
agencies under the direction of the governor to obtain OFARR approval 
before commencing rulemaking and before publishing any rulemaking 
notice as required by law.210  Neither order changed the APA requirements 
for rulemaking, particularly with respect to the time limits for agencies to 
act, rights of public access and petition, hearing rights, or any other provision 
mandated by law to provide the public access and input. The orders only 
affected communications between the governor and at-will gubernatorial 
appointees and imposed no binding requirements on the state as a whole or 
any citizen. 
The only issue was Whiley’s policy objection to the OFARR process 
for reviewing pending or proposed rules—there was no violation of the APA.  
Both orders left intact the legal remedies to compel compliance by state 
officers with statutory rulemaking requirements.  By choosing an internal 
review process requiring consideration by his staff, the governor merely 
created additional time pressure on his office because the full requirements 
of the APA still applied.  As noted by Justice Polston’s questioning at oral 
argument, if the orders changed the statutory rulemaking requirements, the 
governor would have exceeded his powers because he cannot change the law 
unilaterally.  Thus, with the promulgation of EO 11-72, the governor 
remained within the scope of constitutional executive authority and did not 
encroach on the legislative power. 
B. The Majority Improperly Interpreted Article IV 
The majority relied on strained interpretations of the constitutional 
 
 208  See Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 11–12; Petitioner’s Amended 
Reply, supra note 102, at 17–19, 34. 
 209  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, §§ 1, 4. 
 210  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, supra note 115, § 1.  
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doctrines of separation of powers and the vesting of executive power, as well 
as of the APA.  The opinion approved the rationale of AGO 81-49 and found 
the APA made an agency head responsible for that agency’s rulemaking, 
exclusive of any supervision and direction by the governor and regardless of 
the nature of the appointment.211  The majority concluded the appointee was 
intended to exercise rulemaking authority independent of the governor’s 
preferences, because the legislature placed an agency under the direct 
supervision of a non-elected at-will gubernatorial appointee, but did not 
expressly empower the governor to supervise or direct the actions of that 
official.212  The majority’s analysis conflicted with interpretations and 
applications of article IV in the Florida Constitution by prior governors, and 
deviated from the court’s previously articulated principles of constitutional 
interpretation. 
1. Principles for Interpreting the Florida Constitution 
In Florida jurisprudence, the primary purpose of constitutional 
construction is to discern and effectuate the intent and objective of the 
people.213  Interpretation begins with the specific constitutional provision’s 
text; if the language is clear, use of other interpretive means is 
unnecessary.214  Every part of the Constitution must be construed together 
and given its full effect, particularly if there are multiple provisions on the 
same subject.215  No word or part may be considered mere surplusage.216  
While interpretation relies on the plain and ordinary meaning of the words 
used in each provision, the construction adopted for one section must not 
oppose the clear intention of another.217  If the language of a provision is 
unclear or subject to more than one reasonable meaning, a court must apply 
additional interpretive principles (the “rules of interpretation”) to construe 
 
 211  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 714–15. 
 212  Id. at 715–16 . 
 213  Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053, 1063 (Fla. 2010); 
Caribbean Conservation Corp. v. Fla. Fish & Wildlife Conservation Comm’n, 838 So. 2d 492, 
501 (Fla. 2003); Metro. Dade County v. City of Miami, 396 So. 2d 144, 146 (Fla. 1980); St. 
Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 821–22 (Fla. 1970). 
 214  Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); St. Petersburg 
v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 821–22 (Fla. 1970); State ex rel West v. 
Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 116 (Fla. 1954); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 862 (Fla. 1960) 
(Thornal, J., concurring) (“[i]t is unnecessary to apply rules of construction to arrive at the 
meaning of a constitutional provision when the language of the Constitution is clear and 
explicit.”). 
 215  Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997); Plante v. Smathers, 
372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960). 
 216  Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d at 281; Plante, 372 So. 2d at 936; Gray, 
125 So. 2d at 852.  
 217  Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); Advisory Op. 
to the Governor, 706 So. 2d at 281; Gray, 125 So. 2d at 858. 
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the Constitution, consistent with the intent of the people in adopting the 
instrument.218  The court stated, “[w]here the words admit of two senses, 
each of which is conformable to common usage, that sense is to be adopted 
which, without departing from the literal import of the words, best 
harmonizes with the nature and objects, the scope and design, of the 
instrument.”219  While the rules of statutory interpretation generally apply, 
constitutional construction requires greater flexibility by emphasizing the 
principles of the provision as adopted by the people over strict adherence to 
the literal meaning of the chosen words.220  Finally, the Constitution may not 
be interpreted in a manner leading to an irrational or absurd result.221 
2. The Majority’s Alternate Interpretation of Article IV 
The majority opinion created an alternate view of article IV, sections 
1(a) and 6, that conflicted with previous interpretations and applications of 
the scope of executive power vested by the Florida Constitution.  Established 
principles of interpretation should have compelled the majority to utilize the 
tools of construction to determine the full intent of the people in adopting 
sections 1(a) and 6.  The governor relied on the constitutional text, the court’s 
prior decisions, and the actions of his predecessors to argue the historically-
accepted interpretation of the vested executive power.222  The governor has 
sufficient constitutional authority to direct and supervise his at-will 
appointed subordinates, including authority to direct the formulation and 
implementation of policy through the rulemaking of agencies directed by 
such appointees.223  The majority, however, adopted a contrary 
interpretation—the governor’s executive power did not extend to appointed 
agency heads because the APA purportedly placed the exercise of delegated 
rulemaking authority by these officers outside his control.224 
This conclusion conflicted with the court’s prior interpretation of the 
interaction between article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, and the organization of 
the executive branch agencies under Florida Statutes, Chapter 20.  In Jones 
v. Chiles, a compensation claims judge petitioned the court for a writ of 
mandamus ordering Governor Chiles to reappoint the judge for another four-
 
 218  Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d at 822; State ex rel West, 74 So. 2d at 116. 
 219  State ex rel West, 74 So. 2d at 116 (quoting JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 633 (5th ed., 1905)). 
 220  Coastal Fla. Police Benevolent Ass’n v. Williams, 838 So. 2d 543, 548 (Fla. 2003). 
 221  Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. 678 So. 2d 1239, 1247 (Fla. 
1996); Plante, 372 So. 2d at 936 (citing City of Miami v. Romfh, 63 So. 440 (1913)). 
 222  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 32–34, 38–44. 
 223  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 26–27, 30–54.  
 224  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). See, FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54(3)(a)1, 
120.54(3)(e)1 (2010). 
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year term.225  The relevant statute required a statewide nominating 
commission to consider the reappointment of all compensation claims judges 
prior to the expiration of their respective terms.226  If the commission 
recommended retention, the statute required the governor to reappoint the 
judge for another four-year term.227  If the commission declined retention, 
the governor could not reappoint the judge.228  Concerning the judge, the 
commission recommended retention but the governor refused 
reappointment.229  The judge argued reappointment was merely a ministerial 
task once the commission approved retention, and the governor had no 
discretion to refuse.230 The governor argued the statute violated the 
separation of powers by depriving him of his gubernatorial prerogative to 
appoint executive branch officers.231 
The Florida Supreme Court noted that these compensation claims 
judges served under a department of the executive branch  headed by a 
secretary appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor.232  After 
examining article IV, sections 1(a) and 6 as well as the statute, the court 
concluded that because the head of the agency was an at-will gubernatorial 
appointee, the direct authority to appoint compensation claims judges could 
be placed only in the governor or the department secretary.233 If placed with 
the Secretary, the exercise of that authority remained subject to the 
governor’s constitutional power to direct and supervise the Secretary.234 
In Jones v. Chiles, the Court expressly interpreted the consequences of 
denominating an at-will gubernatorial appointee as the head of an 
administrative entity and recognized that the secretary exercised the 
authority delegated by statute, subject to the continuing oversight and 
direction of the governor.235  In Whiley, the governor argued the holding from 
 
 225   Jones v. Chiles, 638 So. 2d 48 (Fla. 1994); see FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (2016) (the Office 
of the Judges of Compensation Claims is created by statute, not the Florida Constitution).  
 226  FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991).   
 227  Jones, 638 So. 2d at 48–49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991)).  
 228  Jones, 638 So. 2d at 48–49 (citing FLA. STAT. § 440.45 (1991)).  As noted by the court, 
during the pendency of the case, the legislature amended the statute to eliminate this power 
of the commission and place the power of reappointment solely in the Governor. See also id. 
at 52 n.3 (citing 1993 Fla. Laws 415). 
 229  Id. at 48–49.   
 230  Id. at 50.   
 231  Id.  
 232  Jones, 638 So. 2d at 50. At that time the Judges of Compensation Claims were under 
the Department of Labor and Employment Security. See FLA. STAT. § 20.171 (1991), which 
was repealed by 2002 Fla. Laws 194, § 69.  The Office of the Judges of Compensation Claims 
previously was placed under the director of the Division of Administrative Hearings. See 2001 
Fla. Laws 91. 
 233  Id.  
 234  Id.  
 235  The APA definition of “agency head” in effect during 1991 was identical to the 
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Chiles for this very point.236  In contrast, Whiley’s counsel only referenced 
the case as an example of legislative encroachment into the executive power.  
Whiley did not comment on the court’s express construction in Chiles of 
article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, that effectively validated the governor’s 
authority to direct and supervise at-will agency head appointees.237  
Interestingly, the Whiley majority did not even address Jones v. Chiles and 
its interpretation of article IV, sections 1(a) and 6.  Instead, the majority 
constructed and applied a contrary and novel interpretation of the same 
constitutional language, ruling that the legislative designation of an at-will 
appointee as an agency head precluded the governor from directing or 
supervising that official’s exercise of delegated power.238  Contrast the 
majority rationale in Whiley discussing the impact of article IV, sections 1(a) 
and 6, on statutory delegations of authority to agency heads with the 
conclusion on that issue in Jones v. Chiles: 
As the chief executive officer in whom the supreme executive 
power is vested, (FN1. See art. IV, § 1(a), Fla. Const.) the 
Governor has direct supervision over all executive departments 
unless the legislature places that supervision in the hands of one 
of the following other executive officers: the lieutenant governor, 
the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer or board 
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. See art. 
IV, §§ 1(a), 6, Fla. Const. Inherent in that direct supervisory 
authority is the power to appoint executive officers to public 
office . . . . 
Under section 20.171, the Department of Labor and Employment 
Security comes under the direct supervision of the Secretary of 
Labor and Employment Security, an officer who is appointed by 
and serves at the pleasure of the Governor. As such, only the 
Governor or the Secretary of Labor and Employment Security, 
subject to the Governor’s approval, would have the power to 
appoint judges of compensation claims.239 
By not overruling Jones v. Chiles, the Whiley majority effectively 
created a second “reasonable” interpretation of article IV, sections 1(a) and 
6, compelling use of the full tools of constitutional interpretation: “[t]o 
 
statutory definition in place when the Governor promulgated EO 11-01. Compare FLA. STAT. 
§ 120.52(3) (2011), with FLA. STAT. § 120.52(3) (1991) (the language in both sections is the 
same: ‘“[a]gency head’ means the person or collegial body in a department or other 
governmental unit statutorily responsible for final agency action.”). 
 236  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). 
 237  Petitioner’s Amended Reply to Respondent’s Response to Petition for Writ of Quo 
Warranto and Amicus Brief of the Attorney General at 5, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 
2011) (No. SC 11-592). 
 238  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 713–15. 
 239  Jones, 638 So. 2d at 50. 
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prevent an interpretation of this language which would lead to an 
unreasonable conclusion, or to one such as was not intended by the framers, 
we are privileged to look to the historical background of this particular 
provision.”240  Although the majority acknowledged the need for further 
interpretation by delving into the historical record of prior actions by Florida 
governors directing and supervising agency rulemaking, the constrained 
scope of this attempt failed to answer two key questions.  First, what was the 
legislature’s intent in framing, and the people in adopting, article IV, sections 
1(a) and 6, in the 1968 Constitution? Second, how should article IV, sections 
1(a) and 6, be construed together to give full effect to each section? 
3. Historical Guidance: Past Practices of Governors 
How should the Whiley majority have considered the practices of prior 
governors in directing and supervising rulemaking by administrative 
agencies?  Four different governors directed the rulemaking of agencies 
headed by at-will appointees to conform to express policy decisions.241  
Governor Scott argued these precedents demonstrated his predecessors’ 
historical understanding that the constitutional executive power authorized 
his continued direction and supervision of agencies headed by at-will 
gubernatorial appointees.242 The majority dismissed the governor’s reliance 
by opining that Governor Chiles’ Executive Orders 95-74 and 95-256 were 
“clearly limited to review of agency rules,” a conclusion contrary to the 
actual text of these orders.243 
EO 95-74, section 1, required each agency to review its rules 
thoroughly but then directed each agency “to proceed immediately to repeal 
obsolete rules” identified by such review.244  EO 95-256 reiterated the 
requirement for a thorough review and report of existing agency rules and 
mandated implementation of express policy pertaining to rulemaking.245  The 
order directed agencies “to take immediate steps to repeal rules, to carry out 
Executive Order 95-74.”246  The order further directed agencies to begin 
rulemaking proceedings to “overhaul, amend, or repeal” the rules identified 
for such treatment in their respective reports.247  The order created  “The Rule 
 
 240  St Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970). 
 241  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–51. 
 242  Response to Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 121, at 41–44.   
 243  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 712. 
 244  Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-74 (February 27, 1995); see also Stephen T. Maher, The 
Death of Rules: How Politics is Suffocating Florida, 8 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 313, 321–24 
(1996). 
 245  Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256 (July 12, 1995); see also Maher, supra note 244, at 
324–328.  
 246  Id. at § 1. 
 247  Id. at § 3. 
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of Flexibility”—Governor Chiles’ express statement of policy guiding 
agency decisions to implement or interpret controlling statutes by ruleand 
mandated the agencies conduct all rulemaking according to this principle.248  
The order was “directed to the Governor’s agencies.”249 
The Whiley majority thought the critical difference between the 1995 
and 2011 orders was that, under the 1995 order, the agencies “remained free 
to engage in the proposal, amendment, and repeal of rules without approval 
from a member of the Executive Office of the Governor.”250  This distinction 
is without difference.  In 1995, Governor Chiles directly ordered how each 
“Governor’s agency” (those headed by appointees serving at his pleasure) 
was to proceed with particular types of rulemaking and what overarching 
policy to apply.251  In 2011, Governor Scott directed how similar agency 
heads were to approach particular rulemaking decisions.252  In both cases, 
the governor supervised and directed specific rulemaking actions and 
activities.  Governor Scott delegated the receipt, review, and notification 
function to a designee in his office, while Governor Chiles imposed just as 
significant restrictions on agency policy action, without requiring an 
intermediate step.253 
Governors Graham, Martinez, and Crist directed similar unequivocal 
rulemaking mandates to administrative agencies.254  The common practice 
among these governors, with different political agendas and policy 
preferences, belies the majority’s espoused narrow view. 
4. Historical Guidance: Crafting Article IV, Section 6 
What was the intent of the legislature in framing, and the people in 
adopting, article IV, sections 1(a) and 6 as part of the 1968 Constitution?  In 
a prior analysis of a constitutional provision requiring resort to extrinsic 
methods of construction to determine its reasonable meaning and the 
framers’ intent, the court studiously considered the textual development in 
the 1966 study commission and the legislature of 1967 thru 1968.255  The 
1966 study commission expressly debated and partly rejected legislative 
control of the governor’s authority over the executive branch agencies 
 
 248  Id. at 4. 
 249  Id. at § 8. 
 250  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 713 (Fla. 2011). 
 251  Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, supra note 245, §§ 2, 3, 4. 
 252  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-01, supra note 52, §§ 1, 4, 5; Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-
72, supra note 115, §§ 1, 6. 
 253  Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, supra note 245, §§ 1, 4, 8. 
 254  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 1981-74 ( July 2, 1981); Fla. Exec. Order No. 1981-105 ( 
Sept. 4, 1981); Fla. Exec. Order No. 1989-01 (Jan. 5, 1989); Fla. Exec. Order No. 2007-127 
(July 13, 2007). See also, Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 349–51.  
 255  St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970). 
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resulting from the new reorganization.256  During its consideration and 
drafting of article IV, the legislature went further and struck all text 
providing for legislative control over the elected officials’ authority to direct 
and supervise subordinate executive officials.257  This extensive 
consideration and rejection of legislative control conclusively shows the 
intent of the framers when drafting article IV, section 6, and of the people 
when they adopted the 1968 Constitution, which directly contravened the 
majority’s conclusion.  By authorizing the legislature to place agencies under 
the direct supervision of non-elected, at-will appointees, the people intended 
neither to authorize the apportionment of executive authority to subordinates 
independent from the governor nor divest the governor’s authority and 
responsibility for their actions. 
5. Integrated Construction of Article IV, Giving Each Section 
Full Effect 
How should article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, be construed to give full 
effect to each section?  The current Florida Constitution vests the executive 
power of the people, divided among particular officials, under limitations 
deemed necessary to preserve individual liberty, just as each executive 
article in every prior version of the Constitution.258  The majority failed to 
address the significance of readopting the same language used since 1845 to 
describe the governor’s power and the necessity of understanding that 
language in its proper historical context.  Nor did the majority consider the 
importance of the development of present article IV, section 6, in the 1966 
study commission and in the legislature, which led to a section solely 
purposed with reorganizing the executive branch.259  After 1968, and until 
2011, the three branches of Florida government applied the newly-adopted 
text in article IV, section 6 in a manner consistent with the historical 
interpretation of section 1(a).260 
The majority misapplied a basic rule of construction by reading the text 
of article IV, section 6, as implying legislative authority to create appointed 
agency heads with the ability to exercise executive power independent from 
the governor.261  This reading conflicted with the clear text of section 6 and 
the legislature’s historical understanding of the constitutional authority to 
create and empower administrative departments.  Interpreting the text as 
 
 256  Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 407–10.   
 257  Id. at 410–13.  
 258  See FLA. CONST. art. III (1838); FLA. CONST. art. III (1861); FLA. CONST. art. V (1868) 
(amended 1871); FLA. CONST. art. IV (1885); FLA. CONST. art. IV (1968) (amended 1998).  
 259  Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–15. 
 260  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 341–43, 345–54. 
 261  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 714 (Fla. 2011). See section IV.B.1, for the discussion 
of constitutional interpretive principles in section IV.B.1 of this article. 
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implying some authority to create independently-acting, appointed agency 
heads also conflicts with the framers’ use of express language to restrict the 
power vested in the governor.  Those express constitutional provisions 
constraining the governor place certain portions of executive power under 
separate authorities.  Accordingly, the legislature may affect the allocation 
of executive power only when expressly authorized in the Constitution.  One 
example is the scope of authority for the Commissioner of Agriculture, who 
is elected directly by the people and has “supervision of all matters pertaining 
to agriculture,” unless the legislature provides otherwise by law.262  Article 
IV, section 6, authorizes the legislature to reorganize the executive branch 
and determine which official (or officials) would directly administer the 
operations of each department; it does not authorize the legislature to limit 
or expand a given official’s scope of authority relative to the governor’s 
vested powers.263 
The majority’s analysis failed to give full effect to the intent of the 
framers in proposing, and the people in adopting, article IV, section 6.  In 
developing and proposing section 6, the legislature expressly considered and 
rejected the authority to enable those agency heads appointed by and serving 
at the pleasure of the governor to exercise their authority, without the 
governor’s direction and supervision.264  As shown by the final text, the 
purpose of section 6 was to ensure that elected constitutional executives 
(principally the governor) retained authority and responsibility for 
supervising and controlling the actions of the executive departments.265  This 
purpose is discerned by construing together and giving effect to all 
provisions of article IV, beyond the majority’s unduly-narrow reading 
limited to section 6.266 
Reliance on AGO 81-49 disserved the majority’s construction of article 
IV.  The attorney general is authorized by statute to issue official opinions to 
a limited range of state executive officers, members of the legislature, and 
certain local officials.267  The courts carefully consider these opinions, which 
are regarded as highly persuasive when addressing the particular legal 
 
 262  FLA. CONST. art. IV. § 4(d).   
 263  Id. at § 6 (“All functions of the executive branch of state government shall be allotted 
among not more than twenty-five departments, exclusive of those specifically provided for or 
authorized in this constitution. The administration of each department, unless otherwise 
provided in this constitution, shall be placed by law under the direct supervision of the 
governor, the lieutenant governor, the governor and cabinet, a cabinet member, or an officer 
or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor . . . . “).  
 264  Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–413. 
 265  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
 266  See Advisory Op. to the Governor, 706 So. 2d 278, 281 (Fla. 1997); Plante v. 
Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 852 (Fla. 1960). 
 267  FLA. STAT. § 16.01(3) (2018). 
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issue.268  State and local officers may rely on an opinion in performing their 
official duties, unless and until that opinion is superseded by a judicial 
decision.269  Above all, attorney general opinions are not binding on the 
courts, a point expressly noted by the Whiley majority.270  Unlike a contested 
case, the attorney general issues an opinion on the representation of facts 
presented in the petition, not by a weighing of evidence; nor does the attorney 
general have the benefit of a complete analysis of the legal issues by 
opposing advocates.  Particularly, as in Whiley, where the attorney general 
expressly advocated against the continuing viability of AGO 81-49, 
opposition by the very office that issued the opinion should have made the 
court reluctant to apply its reasoning without establishing that this reasoning 
was reliable.271  This is noteworthy because the conclusion of AGO 81-49 
conflicted with the interpretation by the court in  Jones v. Chiles. 
AGO 81-49 misinterpreted the legislature’s power to determine which 
officer should administer an agency as authority to dispossess the governor’s 
ability to direct or supervise the actions of that agency.272  The attorney 
general opinion discussed the duty of the governor to ensure faithful 
execution of the laws, but it did not analyze the interrelationship between 
vesting supreme executive power in section 1(a) and allotting direct 
supervision for an agency’s daily actions under section 6.273  The conclusion 
of AGO 81-49 ignored the impact and consequences of article IV, section 
1(a), by treating the vesting of “supreme executive power” as mere 
surplusage, and narrowly focusing only on section 6.  Properly applying the 
rules of constitutional interpretation to the full text of article IV yields 
precisely the opposite result. 
The majority fell into the same interpretive trap as the author of AGO 
81-49.  The Whiley dissenters, particularly Chief Justice Canady, stressed the 
significance of construing together the full text of articles IV, sections 1(a) 
and 6.274  The Chief Justice succinctly framed the interpretive principles and 
issues in the case.  He articulated both the source of the governor’s authority 
and that the governor acted within his constitutional power to direct agency 
rulemaking by at-will appointees.275  The majority’s response was less than 
clarifying: 
 
 268  State v. Family Bank of Hallandale, 623 So. 2d 474, 478 (Fla. 1993); Beverly v. Div. 
of Beverage of Dep’t of Bus. Reg., 282 So. 2d 657, 660 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973). 
 269  Family Bank of Hallandale, 623 So. 2d at 478 (citing State ex rel. Atl. Coast Line R. 
Co. v. State Bd. of Equalizers, 94 So. 681 (1922)). 
 270  Id. at 478; Beverly, 282 So. 2d at 660; Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 714 (Fla. 2011). 
 271  Amicus Brief of the Attorney General, supra note 35, at 15–17. 
 272  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 354–57. 
 273  AGO 81-49, at 1–2. See FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a). 
 274  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 717–18 (Canady, C.J., dissenting). 
 275  Id. 
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With apparent disregard for the Court’s precedent, the dissents 
deem the Governor all-powerful as “the supreme executive 
power” by virtue of article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida 
Constitution . . . .  The phrase “supreme executive power” is not 
so expansive, however, and to grant such a reading ignores the 
fundamental principle that our state constitution is a limitation 
upon, rather than a grant of, power . . . .  Moreover, the dissents’ 
failure to address the provisions of the APA delegating to agency 
heads the authority to determine whether to go forward with 
proposing, amending, repealing, or adopting rules—i.e., sections 
120.54(3)(a)(1) and 120.54(3)(e)(1), Florida Statutes (2010)—an 
authority that cannot be delegated by any entity other than the 
Legislature, demonstrates the absence of support for the position 
advanced.276 
Three interpretive errors readily appear in this statement.  First, the 
majority failed to give full meaning to all of the text in article IV, sections 
1(a) and 6.  Contrary to the plain language of article IV, the intent of its 
framers, and the history of Florida’s constitutional executive article, the 
majority treated the phrase “supreme executive power” as insubstantial 
surplusage and disregarded its proper use in the construction of section 6.  
Here, the majority apparently accepted Whiley’s assertions at face value and 
failed to take into account the governor’s repeated acknowledgement of the 
constitutional constraints on his authority as well as statutory requirements.  
No attempt was made by the majority to distinguish their reading of the term 
from the usage and understanding applied by the dissents or to explain why 
the phrase did not substantially affect the interpretation of section 6.  Nothing 
in the dissenting opinions showed an obsequious application rendering the 
governor “all powerful;” indeed, both the Chief Justice and Justice Polston 
stressed the constitutional limitations of the governor’s authority. 
Second, the majority failed to discern the proper use of “supreme 
executive power” as a hierarchical statement of the governor’s powers and 
duties.  The majority did not broadly interpret the phrase to make the 
governor all-powerful (a point which the dissenters and the governor 
agreed).  The majority then attempted to refute this fabricated argument by 
emphasizing that the Constitution is a limitation of power.277  The majority 
did not explain what power, precisely, is limited by vesting the “supreme 
executive power” in the governor.  The full text of article IV limits the 
executive power, but the vesting of executive power identified as “supreme” 
shows that the people intended a hierarchical structure for the executive 
 
 276  Id. at 715 (internal citations omitted).  The majority cites no precedent for this 
statement other than tangential references to cases stating the standard principle that the 
Florida Constitution is a document limiting, not granting, power.  
 277  Id. 
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branch—one where the governor has full authority and responsibility unless 
otherwise directed by the express terms of the article.278 
Third, the majority construed statutory delegations of responsibility to 
agency heads for certain rulemaking procedural steps as impliedly limiting 
the governor’s constitutional executive power.  Having fabricated and 
dismissed the argument that “supreme executive power” should be 
interpreted as making the governor all-powerful, the majority then criticized 
the dissenting justices for not discussing the impact of legislative actions 
such as the APA on the governor’s authority as limited by article IV, section 
1(a).279  The majority concluded that the “supreme executive power” of the 
governor could be limited by the APA’s requirements for rulemaking, but 
failed to explain how the legislature could delegate rulemaking authority to 
the executive branch without making the execution of that authority subject 
to the vested constitutional executive power.  The obvious problem with this 
analysis is that if the governor’s supervisory authority is rooted in the 
“limitation” of supreme executive power articulated in section 1(a), it is a 
constitutional power outside of the APA; thus, APA delegations to agency 
heads cannot restrict the executive power vested in the governor.280 
Article IV, section 6, does not authorize the legislature to insulate 
administrative agencies from the supervisory powers of the governor, 
particularly when the agency head serves at the pleasure of the governor.281  
The Constitution expressly constrains the role of the legislature to allocate 
executive functions among a limited number of departments and to assign 
the administration of each agency to the direct supervision of a specifically-
denominated official.282 The legislature has no authority to create an 
unlimited number of officials independent from the governor or to create 
new forms of executive power.  Reasonably harmonized, article IV, sections 
1(a) and (6), clearly show that the intent of the framers and the people was 
not only to reorganize the executive branch agencies, but also to ensure 
subordination of all executive officers to those constitutional officers 
answerable to voters. 
 
 278  See, e.g., Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17.  
 279  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715. 
 280  FLA. STAT. § 120.52(1)(a) (2018) (‘“Agency’ means the following officers or 
governmental entities if acting pursuant to powers other than those derived from the 
constitution . . . . The Governor; each state officer and state department, and each 
departmental unit described in s. 20.04 . . . .”). 
 281  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6.  
 282  Id. As stated in the text of FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6, the legislature by law may allot 
executive functions among a limited number of departments and may provide whether a 
department is supervised directly by the governor, one or more of the other constitutional 
officers, or by one or more individuals appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the 
governor.  The text provides that the governor’s appointing power may be limited by requiring 
senate confirmation or approval by three members of the cabinet.  
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The majority discounted the impact of the governor’s authority to 
remove appointed agency heads serving at his pleasure on whether article 
IV, sections 1(a) and 6, acted to provide the governor with continuing 
authority to direct and supervise administrative rulemaking by such 
officials.283  Because the APA does not expressly delegate authority to the 
governor to direct and supervise agency heads, the majority implied that the 
governor is excluded from any other role in agency rulemaking, a finding 
contrary to the scope of power vested and described in a full reading of 
sections 1(a) and (6).  The majority conflated Florida Statutes, section 
120.54(1)(k), with article IV, section 6, to imply that the legislature created 
at-will appointed agency heads empowered to act independently from the 
governor’s direction and supervision.  The majority dismissed the dissents’ 
interpretation that the statute was designed simply to bar delegations by the 
agency head to agency subordinates so that agency rulemaking would 
proceed only with the knowledge, and accountability, of the agency head.  
But, the agency head’s retention of official responsibility for rulemaking is 
exactly what the law required, and no more: 
An agency head may delegate the authority to initiate rule 
development under subsection (2); however, rulemaking 
responsibilities of an agency head under subparagraph (3)(a)1., 
subparagraph (3)(e)1., or subparagraph (3)(e)6. may not be 
delegated or transferred.284 
The ordinary and plain meaning of “delegate” is to entrust part of one’s 
work, power, authority, or responsibility to be done by another, such as a 
subordinate.285  The “authority” under Florida Statutes, sections 
120.54(3)(a)1 and 120.54(3)(e)1, is a check on rulemaking: the agency may 
not publish a notice of a proposed rule or file a rule for final adoption without 
the approval of the actual agency head.  The wording and structure of Florida 
Statutes, section 120.54(1)(k), shows that the legislature clearly only 
intended that the agency head could not delegate these specific tasks; the 
statute cannot be extrapolated to bar the governor from directing and 
supervising his appointees.  If the legislature intended such a reading, it 
certainly knew how to enact words preventing any third party from directing, 
supervising, influencing, or otherwise asserting authority over any agency 
head in exercising delegated rulemaking authority. 
The majority’s analytical error presumed that where the legislature 
assigns responsibility to an agency without expressly providing for 
gubernatorial supervision, the legislature disables the governor from 
 
 283  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 715. 
 284  FLA. STAT. § 120.54(1)(k) (2018). 
 285  Delegate, OXFORD ONLINE DICTIONARY, 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/delegate (last visited Dec. 19, 2018). 
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supervising the activity.  The reality is precisely the opposite: if the 
legislature intends to remove a subordinate from direct accountability to that 
official’s immediate superior, it does so through express legislation.286  In 
supervising agency heads, where the legislature may act but chooses not to 
do so, the governor retains presumptive authority to direct the actions of 
those serving at the governor’s pleasure. 
6. The Importance of Article IV, Section 1(a) as a Self-
Executing Provision 
The Florida Constitution itself vests the supreme executive power in 
the governor; the clause is self-executing, requiring no further action for its 
implementation or completion.287  This means the Constitution fully vested 
the governor with the supreme executive power before the legislature 
reorganized the executive branch and created Florida Statutes, Chapter 20.  
In construing article IV, sections 1(a) and 6, in pari materia, every statutory 
allocation of departmental administration to an at-will gubernatorial 
appointee remained subject to the supreme power vested and existing in the 
governor at the time the statute was enacted.  The subsequent adoption of 
rulemaking procedures in the APA in 1974, including the definition of 
“agency head,” was subject to both the vested authority of the governor and 
the existing allotment of administrative supervision.288  Because the framers 
of the Constitution expressly rejected legislative control over the scope of 
executive power to direct and supervise administrative agencies, and because 
the authority in article IV, section 6, is limited to allotting supervision of 
agency administration, the power already vested in the governor provided 
full authority to direct and supervise at-will appointed agency heads absent 
constitutionally-valid, express language.289 
 
 286  See Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., 678 So. 2d 1239, 
1248 (Fla. 1996). 
 287  See Fla. Dep’t of Educ. v. Glasser, 622 So. 2d 944, 947 (Fla. 1993) (“Had the framers 
of the 1968 Florida Constitution intended a self-executing grant of power, they could have 
chosen self-executing language. Our present constitution contains numerous examples of such 
phrases . . . . ‘The supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor.’”) (quoting FLA. 
CONST. art. IV, § 1(a)); see also Gray v. Bryant, 125 So. 2d 846, 851 (Fla. 1960) (“The basic 
guide, or test, in determining whether a constitutional provision should be construed to be 
self-executing, or not self-executing, is whether or not the provision lays down a sufficient 
rule by means of which the right or purpose which it gives or is intended to accomplish may 
be determined, enjoyed, or protected without the aid of legislative enactment.  If the provision 
lays down a sufficient rule, it speaks for the entire people and is self-executing.”) (citing State 
ex rel. City of Fulton v. Smith, 194 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. 1946); City of Shawnee v. Williamson, 
338 P.2d 355 (Okla. 1959)). FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 1(a). 
 288  See FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a), 6; FLA. STAT. §§ 20.02–05 (1973). 
 289  See Fla. Exec. Order No. 1995-256, § 4, supra note 245 (quoting in part FLA. CONST. 
art. IV, § 6); Miller, Historical Development, supra note 17, at 410–413. 
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7. No Absurd Result 
No matter how novel the proposed analysis or esoteric the argument, 
properly interpreting the Florida Constitution requires a pragmatic approach: 
“‘[t]he Constitution is concerned with substance and not with form and its 
framers did not intend to forbid a common-sense application of its 
provisions.’”290  An interpretation leading to an absurd result must be 
rejected if the provision may be interpreted differently to accomplish the 
intent of the people.291  Courts must avoid interpretations leading to 
unreasonable or absurd consequences that the people did not intend.292  
Plainly defined, an interpretation is “absurd” if it is ridiculously 
unreasonable or lacks a rational or orderly relationship to human reality.293 
The majority rejected the concept that the power to remove at-will 
gubernatorial appointees exemplified the authority to direct and supervise 
those officials in the exercise of delegated rulemaking authority.294  The 
justices inverted a line from the governor’s argument, declaring “the power 
to remove is not analogous to the power to control.”295  This interpretation is 
counterintuitive to the understanding of basic human nature that the federal 
and state executives, legislators, courts, and commentators articulate.296  The 
Congressional debates over executive power, and the recurring reservations 
about the impact on an independent judiciary of the legislative power of 
appropriation, point to a consensus conclusion diametrically opposed to that 
of the Whiley majority: the delegated power to direct the actions and control 
the exercise of governmental authority directly flows from the power to 
 
 290  See State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 118 (Fla. 1954) (approving Meredith v. 
Kauffman, 169 S.W.2d 37, 38 (Ky. 1943) (emphasis in original). 
 291  Plante v. Smathers, 372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979) (citing Miami v. Romfh, 63 So. 
440 (Fla. 1913)). 
 292  St. Petersburg v. Briley, Wild & Associates, Inc., 239 So. 2d 817, 822 (Fla. 1970) 
(citing Florida Dry Cleaning & Laundry Bd. v. Everglades Laundry, Inc., 188 So. 380 (Fla. 
1939)). 
 293  Absurd, MERRIAM-WEBSTER ONLINE DICTIONARY, http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/absurd (last visited Dec. 19, 2018). 
 294  Construing both FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1(a) and 6, the power to remove at-will 
employees arises under the broad mandate of authority to the governor in § 1(a).  
 295  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). 
 296  State ex rel. Albritton v. Lee, 183 So. 782, 790 (Fla. 1938) (Ellis, C.J., concurring) 
(quoting 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW, 281 (O. Holmes ed., 12th ed. 1873) 
(“In his excellent work, Commentaries on American Law, which has been recognized since 
1826 as containing a clear and correct elucidation of the fundamental principles of the 
American governmental system, Honorable James Kent expresses the thought in the 
following words: ‘It would be in vain to declare that the different departments of government 
should be kept separate and distinct, while the legislature possessed a discretionary control 
over the salaries of the executive and judicial officers. This would be to disregard the voice 
of experience and the operation of invariable principles of human conduct. A control over a 
man’s living is, in most cases, a control over his actions.’”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 
(Alexander Hamilton).  
MILLER (DO NOT DELETE) 1/16/2019  11:09 AM 
44 SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL [Vol. 43:1 
remove such at will officers because of the control over subordinates’ 
livelihood.  The majority’s conclusion runs counter to basic observations 
about human nature reflected and incorporated into the fabric of both the 
U.S. and Florida Constitutions. 
8. The People’s Intent 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that although the Constitution gives 
Congress the power to restrict presidential control of appointees, such power 
has its inherent limits: “(i)n its pursuit of a ‘workable government,’ Congress 
cannot reduce the Chief Magistrate to a cajoler-in-chief.”297 This observation 
succinctly summarizes the clear intent of the people in adopting the 1968 
Florida Constitution: to provide the governor with full authority and 
responsibility for the exercise of executive power, excluding only that which 
is vested in other elected officials, subject to express constitutional 
limitations. Thus, the interpretation by the Whiley dissenters gives complete 
effect to the intent of the framers in drafting (and the people in adopting) 
article IV. 
Each constitutional provision must be interpreted in light of the purpose 
to be accomplished “and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or 
remedied.”298  The court has repeatedly stated that its purpose is to fulfill, 
never frustrate, the will of the people.299  A practical test of constitutional 
interpretation is examining subsequent legislative determinations about the 
meaning of a provision; if the text is subject to more than one interpretation, 
the interpretation adopted by the legislature is given great deference by the 
courts.300  The legislature has enacted numerous laws that require full 
efficacy on a structured administrative chain of command in order to provide 
for the direction and supervision of subordinates through the agency head.301  
The agency head in turn is subject to the vested, inherent authority of the 
 
 297  Free Enterprise Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477, 502 (2010) 
(relying on THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) and highlighting presidential control 
over appointees as a foundational principle from the beginning of the U.S. Constitution). 
 298  State ex rel. West v. Gray, 74 So. 2d 114, 115 (Fla. 1954). 
 299  Id.; Browning v. Fla. Hometown Democracy, Inc., 29 So. 3d 1053, 1063 (Fla. 2010); 
Benjamin v. Tandem Healthcare, Inc., 998 So. 2d 566, 570 (Fla. 2008); Plante v. Smathers, 
372 So. 2d 933, 936 (Fla. 1979); In re Advisory Op. to Governor Request, 374 So. 2d 959, 
964 (Fla. 1979).  
 300  Agency for Health Care Admin. v. Associated Indus. of Fla., Inc., 678 So. 2d 1239, 
1247 (Fla. 1996) (quoting Greater Loretta Improvement Ass’n v. State ex rel. Boone, 234 So. 
2d 665, 669 (Fla.1970)).  
 301   For example, the general duties of all agency heads are outlined in FLA. STAT.  § 20.05 
(2018).  The Department of Business and Professional Regulation and its several divisions 
are placed under a secretary appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor. FLA. 
STAT. § 20.165(1) (2018).  One of these units is the Division of Alcoholic Beverages and 
Tobacco, administered by a subordinate official, the Division Director, and expressly 
authorized to appoint and train division personnel. FLA. STAT. § 561.11 (2018). 
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governor to supervise administrative agencies.  For example, when creating 
the Agency for Health Care Administration, the legislature placed the agency 
in a particular department but excluded that departmental secretary from any 
control over the agency.302  Although the enabling statute required the 
agency director to report to the governor, the statute otherwise was silent as 
to the governor’s role.303  The court found the legislature intended the agency 
to answer to the governor because the agency head was made an at-will 
gubernatorial appointee.304  Similarly, the Agency for Persons with 
Disabilities is housed administratively in the Department of Children and 
Family Services, but is not subject to the direction, supervision, or control of 
any function by that department.305  Rather, the director of the Agency for 
Persons with Disabilities serves as the agency head for all purposes.306  The 
First District Court of Appeal found no constitutional infirmity with this 
structure.307  The legislature understands that executive power requires a 
chain of command, which subjects subordinates to the direction and control 
of more senior personnel concerning agency rulemaking.  This  principle is 
even applicable to regulatory boards, where members are appointed for 
specific terms and cannot be removed except for cause.308 
The following examples show how the legislature uses express 
statutory language to recognize the governor’s authority to supervise and 
direct those agencies headed by appointees serving at the governor’s 
pleasure.  To “promote accountability, integrity, and efficiency in 
government . . . .” the legislature established an Office of Inspector General 
in each agency.309  For agencies under the jurisdiction of the cabinet or 
governor and cabinet, that agency head is authorized to appoint or remove 
the agency inspector general.310  Specifically, “(f)or state agencies under the 
jurisdiction of the Governor,” the chief inspector general, who is appointed 
by and serving at the pleasure of the governor, appoints or removes agency 
inspector generals.311  Because the statute provides no additional language 
 
 302  FLA. STAT. § 20.42 (1992).  
 303  Agency for Health Care Admin., 678 So. 2d at 1247 (quoting FLA. STAT. § 20.42 
(1991)). 
 304  Id. at 1248 (AHCA later was restructured as a separate department); see FLA. STAT. § 
20.42(2) (2018) (showing the Secretary still is appointed by the Governor, confirmed by the 
Senate, and serves at the Governor’s pleasure). 
 305  FLA. STAT. § 20.197 (2018). 
 306  Id. at § 20.197(1). 
 307  J.M. v. Fla. Agency for Persons with Disabilities, 938 So. 2d 535, 538 n. 4 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
 308  FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 6(b). 
 309  FLA. STAT. § 20.055(2) (2018). 
 310  Id. at  § 20.055(3)(a)1, (3)(c). 
 311  FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2018); id. at § 20.055(3) (emphasis added); FLA. STAT. § 
20.055(3)(a)1, (3)(c) (2018). 
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“authorizing” the governor to “direct agencies,” the quoted clause is a 
legislative acknowledgement of the governor’s existing authority over 
agencies headed by at-will gubernatorial appointees.  In turn, the statute 
creating and authorizing the chief inspector general refers to “agencies under 
the jurisdiction of the Governor.”312  The text and context of both statutes 
are not limited merely to the EOG or a department where the legislature 
expressly designates the governor as the agency head.  Instead, the statutes 
clearly convey the legislative understanding that the governor has directory 
and supervisory authority over a number of agencies premised on the 
constitutionally vested executive power. 
The legislature also uses express statutory language when insulating 
appointed officials from the governor’s direction and supervision.  One 
example is the Division of Administrative Hearings (“DOAH”), created to 
conduct evidentiary hearings under the APA.313  Housed in the Department 
of Management Services314 for administrative purposes, DOAH is not 
“subject to the control, supervision, or direction by the Department of 
Management Services in any manner . . . .”315  The same statute designates 
the director of DOAH as its agency head and requires, upon Senate 
confirmation, the director’s appointment by the Administration 
Commission.316  This places the director outside the authority of the 
department secretary and the governor. 
As shown by these examples, since 1969, shortly after article IV, 
section 6, was adopted as part of the 1968 Florida Constitution, the 
legislature repeatedly determined that the interaction of sections 1(a) and 6 
empowered the governor to direct and supervise at-will appointed executive 
branch officials absent valid, express language in the Constitution or statute 
providing otherwise.  The Whiley majority interpreted a lack of express 
authorization in the APA as a lack of authority in the governor.317  As shown 
by reading all of article IV in pari materia, and by the foregoing statute 
examples, the opposite is the case.  In instances where the legislature may 
act to limit the scope of the governor’s administrative authority but does not 
do so, the governor retains the authority to direct and supervise at-will 
appointees.  The dissenters in Whiley, not the majority, correctly articulated 
 
 312  FLA. STAT. § 14.32(1) (2018) (emphasis added). 
 313  See FLA. STAT. §§ 120.56(1)(c), 120.569(2)(a), 120.65(1) (2018). See also Patricia A. 
Dore, Access to Florida Administrative Proceedings, 13 FLA. STATE U. L. REV. 965, 1017 
(1986).  
 314  FLA. STAT. § 20.22(1) (2018) (stating that the head of the Department of Management 
Services is appointed by and serves at the pleasure of the Governor). 
 315  FLA. STAT. § 120.65(1) (2018). 
 316  FLA. STAT. § 14.202 (2018) (stating that the Administration Commission is comprised 
of the governor and cabinet, with the governor as chair of the commission).  
 317  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). 
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the same understanding of the constitutional provisions defined by the 
legislature, which is consistent with the interpretation and application of the 
executive power since the founding of the State.318  As a result, the majority 
opinion strayed from an interpretation that has been articulated and applied 
for decades. 
VI. CONSEQUENCES OF THE WHILEY DECISION 
The Whiley majority rendered their decision by granting the petition for 
writ of quo warranto but withheld issuing the writ, noting: 
We trust that any provision in Executive Order 11–72 suspending 
agency compliance with the APA, i.e., rulemaking, will not be 
enforced against an agency at this time, and until such time as the 
Florida Legislature may amend the APA or otherwise delegate 
such rulemaking authority to the Executive Office of the 
Governor.319 
Fairly construing the majority’s adjuration with the plain text of EO 11-
72, there was arguably no need for further action because the executive order 
did not suspend compliance with the APA.  Although the court in prior cases 
followed a similar pattern of granting the petition, issuing an opinion, and 
withholding the writ, the effect of this decision appears to be as an advisory 
opinion since it does not provide an actual remedy.320  Justice Polston 
asserted as much in his dissent.321 Nevertheless, the governor acquiesced to 
the majority by replacing EO 11-72 with Executive Order 11-211 (“EO 11-
211”).322  EO 11-211 required each agency headed by a gubernatorial 
appointee to submit rulemaking documentation to OFARR for review at least 
one week prior to submitting the documents for publication.323  The 
precatory findings of that order strongly disagreed with the majority opinion 
and its interpretation of the governor’s constitutionally-derived powers, but 
then concluded “the majority opinion in Whiley is to be afforded the 
deference due a judgment of the [Florida] Supreme Court.”324  This final 
observation is questionable because, there was no writ, mandate, nor 
“judgment” that was issued.325  Thus, the court left unclear as a matter of law 
whether the case was decided conclusively. 
 
 318  Id. at 717–18, 723–26.  
 319  Id. at 717. 
 320  See Florida House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616 (Fla. 2008). 
 321  Whiley, 79 So. 3d at 726 (Polston, J., dissenting). 
 322  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-21, supra note 328, at 1. 
 323  Id. at 7, § 2.  
 324  Id. at 5.  
 325  See Case Docket for SC11-592 at http://onlinedocketssc.flcourts.org/DocketResults/ 
CaseDocket?Searchtype=Case+Number&CaseYear=2011&CaseNumber=592 (last visited 
Nov. 27, 2018). The docket shows only a “disposition-granted” dated Aug. 16, 2011.  
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The Florida Legislature accepted the Supreme Court’s invitation to 
amend the APA.  Here, the legislature found that the governor’s position in 
the case was consistent with the historical understanding and context, 
judicial precedent, and legislative application.326  As a result, the legislature 
amended both Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, and the APA, expressly 
conforming the law with the proper interpretation of applicable 
constitutional texts, and ensuring the governor’s continuing authority to 
direct and supervise appointed agency heads serving at the governor’s 
pleasure. 
A. Executive Order 11-211 
EO 11-211 superseded EO 11-72 but continued the governor’s 
delegation of oversight and review functions to OFARR.  Agencies headed 
by at-will gubernatorial appointees were required to provide OFARR with 
the text of all proposed new or amended rules, repeals, and all notices for 
publication.327  However, the agencies were no longer required to obtain 
OFARR approval to proceed with the APA rulemaking process.328  The order 
initially set out the governor’s predicate findings; in particular, the 
distinction between the governor, as elected by and answerable to the people 
of the state, and the subordinate appointees who are not so accountable.329  
Notably, EO 11-211 specifically and vigorously disputed the findings and 
rationale of the Whiley majority opinion by restating the interpretation of the 
governor’s powers and duties vested under article IV.330  The order also 
acknowledged approval for the analysis and conclusions of the dissenting 
justices in the Whiley decision.331  However, despite the court failing to issue 
a writ or other remedy, EO 11-211 concluded by treating the majority 
opinion as a valid judgment.332 
B. The Inefficacy of Proceeding in Quo Warranto 
Treating the majority opinion as a valid judgment is debatable.  A 
petition for writ of quo warranto is an original proceeding testing a person’s 
right to hold an office or exercise some right or privilege.333  The Florida 
Supreme Court has discretionary authority to issue the writ but its 
 
 326  2012 Fla. Laws 116, §1. 
 327  Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-211, supra note 328, at 7, § 2.  
 328  See id. at 5–7, §§ 1, 2.  
 329  Id. at 7, § 2. 
 330  Id. at 4–5. 
 331  Id.  
 332  Id. at 5. 
 333  Tracy Raffles Gunn, Original Proceedings in Florida’s Appellate Courts, 32 STETSON 
L. REV. 347, 354 (2003). 
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jurisdiction is limited to state officers or state agencies.334  Typically, 
exercising such a  remedy as to subordinate state officers creates no 
enforcement problems; the executive power and the duty of the governor to 
ensure the faithful execution of the laws afford ample authority to carry out 
the court’s writ.  However, more significant constitutional issues arise when 
the court issues a writ in circumstances that command the governor to cease 
actions for which the court concludes there is no authority. 
What if the governor politely declines to accede to the writ’s 
prohibition?  The Supreme Court arguably could not impose punishment for 
contempt when the governor acts in his or her official capacity.  To do so 
would imply some superiority of the judicial branch over the executive, a 
presumption prohibited by the Florida Constitution.  The court lacks 
authority to remove the duly-elected governor from office, even 
temporarily.335  Thus, issuing the writ to a governor who adamantly opposes 
the court’s authority risks the appearance of interfering with the legitimate 
operation of the executive branch.  Moreover, it would present problems of 
justiciability and would confirm the court’s inability to enforce its own 
orders.  In an earlier opinion dismissing a petition for writ of mandamus to 
compel the governor to issue a certificate of election for a congressional seat, 
Chief Justice Edwin M. Randall explained: 
The proposition . . . is that the Judicial Department of the 
government may control the Executive in reference to an 
executive duty . . . . It has ever been considered by statesmen and 
jurists that where one has a power over another, in a public 
capacity, the one is the greater and the other the inferior 
power . . . . To employ the power of the courts in the business of 
managing the office of the Governor and directing him in the 
exercise of his duties, is to blot out the character given (that office) 
in the Constitution of ‘Supreme Executive’ and ‘Chief Magistrate’ 
of the State, and reduce him to the level of a secretary or county 
clerk . . . . If we have a case in which we cannot punish the 
disobedient, it results that we have no power to command . . . we 
produce no result except the exposure of our own impotence.336 
Issuing an extraordinary writ to the governor presents different issues 
than imposing such a remedy on subordinate officers.  Recognizing this 
discrepancy, the court has a history of granting such petitions and rendering 
such opinions.337  But, the court traditionally withholds the issuance of a writ 
to the governor by relying on the governor’s willingness to accede to the 
 
 334  FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8). 
 335  See FLA. CONST. art. III, § 17; FLA. CONST. art. IV, § 3; FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3. 
 336  State ex rel. Bisbee v. Drew, 17 Fla. 67–73 (1879). 
 337  See Fla. House of Representatives v. Crist, 999 So. 2d 601, 616  (Fla. 2008); Ex parte 
Henderson, 6 Fla. 279, 299 (Fla. 1855) (withholding issuing a writ of mandamus). 
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holding.338 
The Whiley majority closed their opinion with “it is so ordered,” but it 
is difficult to understand the legal and precedential value of such a statement.  
While Florida has a full history and analysis of the use of extraordinary writs, 
particularly quo warranto, there are unanswered questions about the future 
impact of this case.  The court’s jurisdiction is discretionary as to issuing 
writs of quo warranto; however, it is dubious whether such discretion 
extends to granting petitions and declaring an opinion without entering a 
final writ.  If the old common law form of the writ provided the courts with 
broad latitude in an original jurisdiction proceeding, that scope is restricted 
by the jurisdictional limitations in the Florida Constitution.  The original 
scope of the judicial power may have included authority to approve requests 
for extraordinary writs but withhold the actual issuance; however, by 
articulating the scope of the Supreme Court’s quo warranto jurisdiction in 
the Constitution, the people expressed their intent to constrain the court in 
issuing both writs of mandamus and writs of quo warranto.339  Jurisdiction 
does not go to the cause of action articulated in the petition; rather, it goes to 
issuing the writ.  If the court grants the petition, the court found proper 
grounds to issue the writ and resolve the case.  Arguably, if the court declines 
to issue the writ, it can be inferred that the court did not find proper grounds 
to issue one.  In sum, the Constitution does not authorize the use of original 
extraordinary writ jurisdiction to issue binding advisory judgments, 
particularly when a full and complete legal remedy is available.340 
Whiley had a full legal remedy available: an action for declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief in the circuit court.341  While declaratory 
judgment and injunctive relief may lack the intellectual allure and relative 
glamour of proceeding under the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, this 
standard form of action would have benefitted the court’s analysis and 
holding.  All factual disputes, including the actual impact of the governor’s 
executive orders, would have been established in a complete record.  
Additionally, if the judgment demonstrated a significant miscarriage of 
constitutional authority and a need for prompt resolution, the District Court 
of Appeal could certify the decision for immediate Supreme Court review.342  
There would have been no need for the Supreme Court to ask whether the 
case should be referred to the circuit court for fact finding; the record for 
 
 338  Crist, 999 So. 2d at 299; Ex parte Henderson, 6 Fla. at 299 (withholding issuing a writ 
of mandamus). 
 339  FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(8) (1968). 
 340  State ex rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 184 So. 1, 2 (Fla. 1938) (explaining the court will 
not issue a writ in quo warranto where there is an ample and sufficient remedy at law.); see 
also State ex rel. Landis v. Duval County, 141 So. 173, 176 (Fla. 1932). 
 341  FLA. STAT. § 86.011 (2011). 
 342  FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4) (1968); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.030(a)(2)(B), 9.125. 
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review would have been complete and the parties’ legal arguments would 
have matured.343  Above all, the court would have had the advantage of the 
lower court’s consideration of all the issues and articulation of the dispositive 
law. 
It is doubtful that an opinion issued without a final writ or judgment has 
a binding effect, since the court’s jurisdiction to render decisions about the 
scope and extent of the governor’s constitutional powers is limited to 
advisory opinions requested by the governor.  If Whiley is interpreted as an 
advisory opinion because the governor’s substantial participation somehow 
constituted a “request,” or simply because the court withheld the writ and 
any other remedy, the decision is not binding precedent.344 
C. The Legislative Response to the Supreme Court’s Request for 
Clarification 
The Florida Legislature understood the Whiley holding to mean that the 
governor had no inherent constitutional authority to direct and supervise 
agency rulemaking outside of any express legislative delegation in the 
APA.345  The decision meant that agency heads who the governor appointed 
and those serving at his or her pleasure could exercise delegated rulemaking 
authority independent from any accountability to the governor except for the 
possibility of removal from office.  The Whiley majority’s view about how 
the statutes organized executive agencies and delegated rulemaking 
authority was one that misinterpreted the legislature’s intent.346  The 
legislature adopted Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, to organize the functions of 
the executive branch.347  The legislature adopted the APA to standardize the 
proceedings necessary for administrative agencies to execute governmental 
authority provided by statute.348  The various express delegations of 
rulemaking authority in different statutes were made for agencies to 
implement substantive law within the controlling structure established by 
article IV of the Florida Constitution.349  Concerned about the implications 
 
 343  Scheduling Order, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. June 17, 2011) (No. SC 11-
592) (granting Petitioner’s Request for Expedited Oral Argument and scheduling oral 
argument for July 29, 2011). 
 344  In re Advisory Op. to the Governor, 509 So. 2d 292, 301 (Fla. 1987). 
 345  2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(26). 
 346  FLA. STAT. § 120.54(5) (2018) (explaining the statute delegates authority to the 
Administration Commission to adopt the rules of procedure applicable to proceedings under 
the APA).  
 347  FLA. STAT. § 20.02 (2018). 
 348  FLA. STAT. §§ 120.54, 120.56, 120.565, 120.569 (2018). 
 349  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 455.2035 (2018) (authorizing the Department of Business and 
Professional Regulation to adopt rules for licensure programs not placed under a statutory 
regulatory board); FLA. STAT. § 570.07(23) (2018) (authorizing the Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Services to adopt rules implementing any of its statutory duties); FLA. STAT. § 
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for ongoing, effective governmental administration if the Whiley holding 
remained unabated, the legislature moved with alacrity to combat the 
foreseeable chaotic effect of the decision. 
The Whiley decision came at a time of greater legislative attention to 
the implementation of delegated rulemaking authority, particularly the 
economic impact of existing and proposed rules.350  Responding to Whiley, 
similar bills were introduced in the House and Senate to clarify both agency 
administrative authority and the legislature’s longstanding intent for the 
constitutional executives, especially the governor, to direct and supervise at-
will appointees in exercising delegated authority.351  Passed by both 
chambers, the final bill was signed into law on April 13, 2012 as 2012 Florida 
Laws 116.352 
The legislature responded to the court’s invitation for clarification by 
amending Florida Statutes, Chapters 20 and 120, expressly recognizing the 
authority of elected executive branch officers, particularly the governor, to 
direct and supervise those officials who they appoint and who serve at their 
pleasure.353  The first eight sections of the law reiterated the legislative intent 
 
624.308(1) (2018) (authorizing both the Department of Financial Services and the Financial 
Services Commission to adopt rules implementing their respective statutes). 
 350  Miller, Direction and Supervision, supra note 17, at 351–354. 
 351  The bill, a committee substitute for House Bill 7055 (CS/HB 7055) also included 
sections repealing unnecessary statutory delegations of rulemaking authority and establishing 
a continuing process to provide annual recommendations to repeal unnecessary delegations. 
The House bill, introduced by the House Rulemaking & Regulation Subcommittee, was 
carried through its committee stops and presented on the floor by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Ft. 
Walton Bch.). Senate Bill 1312 was introduced and sponsored principally by Sen. Don Gaetz 
(R-Niceville); this bill eventually was tabled by the Senate in favor of the House bill. Effective 
control of authority delegated by the legislature and a common-sense approach to government 
management appears to be more than just a theoretical concept in Florida; it is a family affair. 
Sen. Gaetz is the father of Rep. Gaetz, and the passage of CS/HB 7055 apparently is the first 
instance of a bill being carried in the separate chambers of the Florida Legislature 
simultaneously by sire and scion. See Press Release, Fla. Senate, State Agencies’ Rule-
Making Process To Be Restrained, Governor Approves Gaetz-Gaetz Bill (Apr. 13, 2012), 
https://www.flsenate.gov/Media/PressReleases/Show/1974; H.B. 7055, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 
2012); S.B. 1312, 2012 Leg. (Fla. 2012) (last visited 12/2/2018). 
 352  2012 Fla. Laws 116.  
 353  FLA. STAT. §§ 20.02(3), 20.03(4), 20.03(5), 20.03(13), 20.05(1), 120.515, 120.52(3) 
(2012); see also 2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§  4–8.  Sections 4–8 of the law enacted specific 
amendments to Florida Statutes, Chapter 20, and the APA. Creating Florida Statutes, 
§20.02(3), and amending §20.03(4), the new law expressly stated the administration of an 
executive department placed under an officer or board appointed by and serving at the 
pleasure of the governor remains at all times under the governor’s supervision and direction.  
The law expressly defined the term “to serve at the pleasure” by creating new Florida Statutes, 
§20.03(13), and reiterating that such an appointee “serving at the pleasure” remains subject 
to the direction and supervision of the appointing authority.  Florida Statutes, section 20.05(1), 
was revised to expressly state that agency heads are subject to the constitutional allotment of 
power in the executive branch.  To avoid any further misapprehension, section 3 of the law 
expressly stated the legislature’s intent in making the revisions to Chapter 20 and the APA 
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apparent in the existing statutes, recognizing the capacity for rational and 
pragmatic supervision of delegated rulemaking within the executive 
branch.354  The legislature began by providing detailed findings that 
explained the basis for the statutory amendments, and expressly affirmed that 
both EO 11-72 and EO 11-211 were consistent with state law and public 
policy.355 
Twenty-six detailed findings clarified the legislature’s interpretation of 
existing statutes as not granting at-will gubernatorial appointees any 
autonomous authority.356  The legislature acknowledged the governor’s 
constitutional role as the chief executive officer of the state,  in light of the 
historical understanding of executive power articulated by the framers of the 
U.S. Constitution, and as each version of the Florida Constitution allocated 
executive power.357  The legislature explained the foundation for the bill’s 
clarification of statutory amendments, the relevant interpretation of the 
constitutional assignment of executive power, and the implications for 
statutory powers.358  The law confirmed the APA is only procedural in nature 
and is not intended to intrude into the constitutional authority of elected 
executive officers.359  The legislature clearly adopted a number of the 
predicate paragraphs included in EO 11-211, which shows the congruence 
of understanding between the legislative and executive branches in 
opposition to the Whiley majority.  The legislature expressly disagreed with 
the majority’s rationale by approving the dissenting opinions.360  The 
legislature emphasized the importance of holding appointed officials 
accountable to elected officers and approved the interim results of the 
governor’s OFARR review process.361  The legislative findings concluded 
that the decision in Whiley is accorded the deference due to an advisory 
opinion of the court because the court did not grant the requested relief.362 
 
enumerated in the law: “The Legislature intends that the amendments made by this act to 
[Florida Statutes, §§20.02, 20.03, and 20.05], which apply to the organizational structure of 
the executive branch, and the creation of [Florida Statutes, 120.515], which applies to 
administrative procedure, are to clarify that the placement of an executive department under 
the direct administration of an officer or board appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the 
Governor does not implicitly limit or restrict the Governor’s prerogative, legal authority, and 
constitutional responsibility to direct and supervise the execution of the law and the exercise 
of lawful discretion.” 
 354  2012 Fla. Laws 116, §§ 1–8.  
 355  Id. at §§ 1, 2.  
 356  Id. at § 1.  
 357  Id. at §§ 1(1)–(4). 
 358 Id. at §§ 1(5)–(11), (13)–(15), (17), (20)–(23). 
 359  Id. at § 1(16). 
 360  2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 1(12), (26)(b). 
 361  Id. at §§ 1(20)–(25). 
 362  Id. at § 1(26)(d).  
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The legislature made two amendments to the APA: the first being a 
specific declaration of policy in a new statute section, which confirms the 
procedural nature of the APA and does not impair the authority of elected 
officers to direct and supervise their at-will appointees.363  This section 
addressed a significant issue argued in Whiley by expressly stating that an 
agency head’s adherence to the direction and supervision of the appointing 
officer is not a delegation or transfer of statutory authority.364  For example, 
complying with the governor’s policy directions is not a transfer of the 
rulemaking responsibilities exercisable by the agency head. 
The second amendment emphasized the statutory definition of “agency 
head,” reiterating the express language that the appointee remains subject to 
the direction and supervision of the appointing authority but also confirming 
that the actions of an agency head as authorized by statute are official acts.365  
This latter clause prevents any argument that an otherwise-valid action is 
voidable if done without the permission of the appointing authority.  These 
two amendments to the APA make clear that “direction and supervision” 
constitute proper influence over an agency head’s exercise of statutory 
authority. 
Contrary to the Whiley majority, the legislature found no violation of 
the constitutional separation of powers in EO 11-72.366  The Governor’s 
letter to the Secretary of State transmitting the executed version of  the act367 
noted the concurrence of legislative and executive branch interpretations of 
the governor’s article IV authority over at-will appointees.368  The letter also 
concluded that the statutory revisions in the new law were unnecessary under 
a correct interpretation of the Constitution.369  That may be true.  But, what 
is equally true is that the statutory amendments do not conflict with such an 
interpretation, and the statutory clarifications clearly liberated the governor 
from any force of the Whiley opinion. 
 
 363  FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012); see also id. at §§ 3, 4, 7.  
 364  FLA. STAT. § 120.515 (2012). 
 365  FLA. STAT. § 120.52(3) (2012).  
 366  CS/HB 7055 (2012), signed by the Governor and enacted as 2012 Fla. Laws 116, § 2, 
showing that because EO 11-01 attempted to suspend certain publications by the secretary of 
state, in possible contravention to FLA. STAT. § 120.55 (2010), the order was not endorsed by 
the legislature.  However, any legislative disapproval apparently dissipated  when EO 11-72 
superseded EO 11-01. Fla. Exec. Order No. 2011-72, § 8 (April 8, 2011). 
 367  Upon being approved and signed by the Governor, an act is deposited with the 
Department of State. FLA. STAT. § 15.07 (2018).  The department assigns the actual chapter 
number to an act. FLA. STAT. § 15.155(1)(d) (2018).   
 368  Letter from Rick Scott, Governor of Florida, to Ken Detzner, Secretary of State (April 
13, 2012), at 2, https://www.flgov.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/4.13.12-HB-7055-
Transmittal-Letter.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2018).  
 369  Id. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Since 1787, framers of constitutions (including the Florida 
Constitution) allocated political power among the legislative, executive, and 
judicial branches based on the principle that such delegations vested in 
particular officers’ bodies the entirety of the power so referenced.  The 
Florida Constitution restrains governmental excess by dividing political 
power into three branches, creating further internal divisions within each 
branch, and expressly limiting the exercise of certain vested powers.370  The 
framers of most constitutions presumed the powers vested in each branch 
were not limited only to those expressly discussed in the constitutional text, 
but encompassed authority logically necessary for the particular branch to 
carry out its charge from the people.  This implicitly entails all authority 
distinctively associated with that branch.  The Florida Constitution vests the 
supreme executive power in the governor without detailing the principles, 
doctrines, or limitations of that authority in addition to those expressly stated 
elsewhere in the Constitution because the framers commonly understood the 
scope and meaning of the terms employed.  Thus, the governor’s vested 
authority embraces the entire scope of executive power and function not 
otherwise assigned to another officer or body. 
The Whiley majority viewed rulemaking power as residing in the 
legislature at all times, never implicating any aspect of constitutional power, 
and always controlled exclusively by legislative action.371  Such an absolutist 
interpretation is not warranted by the text of the Florida Constitution; if such 
interpretation was the case, then arguably the legislature could not delegate 
rulemaking to any executive branch official.  The national history of 
understanding, controlling, and applying constitutional executive power, in 
addition to Florida case law, shows that the rulemaking power may be 
delegated to the executive branch with specific limits and controls necessary 
to execute the laws, rather than the unbridled making of public policy.372  The 
operation of delegated rulemaking authority is within the governor’s 
overarching constitutional responsibility to ensure the proper execution of 
the laws.  Unless expressly and clearly limited by the Constitution, the 
governor retains full constitutional authority to direct and supervise the 
 
 370  See FLA. CONST. art. II, § 3, creates the basic separation of powers. FLA. CONST. art. 
III, § 1 divides the legislature into two chambers, and § 8 provides the governor’s veto as a 
check on the legislative power. FLA. CONST. art. IV, §§ 1 and 4 divide the executive power 
between the Governor and three Cabinet members, § 6 provides limits on the Governor’s 
power of appointment through Senate confirmation or Cabinet approval, and § 9 vests certain 
executive functions for fish and wildlife conservation in a separate commission. FLA. CONST. 
art. V, § 1, creates four separate levels of trial and appellate courts in Florida and constrains 
their respective jurisdictions. 
 371  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715–17 (Fla. 2011). 
 372  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 120.52(8), 120.536(1) (2018). 
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actions of subordinate officials, including delegated rulemaking. 
All versions of the Florida Constitution consistently vested the 
governor with the “supreme executive power” while contemporaneously 
creating other executive officers independent from the governor’s control.  
These independent officers are accountable only to the electorate.  The use 
of the word “supreme” creates a hierarchical structure for exercising the 
executive power.  Absent an express provision, the governor remains fully 
authorized and responsible for directing and supervising the executive 
branch’s functions implemented through administrative agencies. 
By only narrowly focusing on certain language in article IV, section 6, 
and not giving a full and complete reading to section 1(a), the Whiley 
majority mistakenly decided the Governor could not direct his at-will 
appointees because the legislature did not expressly allow him to do so.  The 
error in this conclusion is found in the question that logically should be 
answered next: if not subject to the governor’s supervision, then to whom 
are these unelected officials accountable?  The Whiley majority, finding the 
agency had autonomy, did not articulate the accountability of such agency 
heads and thus failed to address the very real consequences of their decision. 
The Florida Constitution does not authorize the creation of bureaucrats 
who are autonomous of any supervision.  The clear intent of the people is for 
those ultimately responsible for the acts of the various branches of 
government to be answerable directly to the electorate.  This is so even if the 
justices themselves periodically stand before the voters for merit retention.373  
From this perspective, the requirements of article IV, section 6, are a 
particular expression of the governor’s supremacy.  Under section 6, apart 
from elected constitutional officers and the members of certain licensing 
boards, the administrative head of any executive department must serve at 
the pleasure of the governor.  The governor is ultimately responsible for 
every executive act that is not the direct responsibility of another elected 
constitutional officer. 
Florida Statutes, section 20.02, states the legislature intended for the 
structure of the executive branch to be consistent with the “executive 
capacity to administer effectively at all levels.”  Under long-standing 
interpretations and applications of executive power vested in the governor, 
the capacity to effectively administer all levels of the executive branch was 
assured by the governor’s authority to direct and supervise at-will 
gubernatorial appointees.  Finding the governor cannot direct or supervise 
at-will appointees in the development of administrative policy is not 
consistent with the full language of the Constitution and section 20.02.  
Contrary to this legislative intent, the Whiley majority lessened that capacity 
 
 373  FLA. CONST. art. V, § 10(a). 
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for effective administration.  If every appointed agency head may pursue 
policy development and implementation without oversight from any elected 
official, and the elected official’s only recourse to achieve consistent 
implementation of preferred policies is to summarily dismiss agency heads, 
then the potential for serial dismissals and disruptions of agency operations 
likely would produce ineffective administration.  In this respect, the 
majority’s rationale authorizes the legislature to create agencies autonomous 
from any executive control, which conflicts with the rationale and conclusion 
in Jones v. Chiles. 
The legislature enacts policy and authorizes entities to administer the 
programs created, but this allocation cannot avoid the constitutional 
determination that all executive action must be accountable to elected 
officials under the Constitution.  The execution of a statutory program must 
operate within the constitutional allocation of executive powers.  This does 
not lessen the power of the legislature but represents the intent of all framers 
of all variants of the Florida Constitution: the substantive power to execute 
the laws enacted by the legislature is vested in the executive.  The executive 
branch has no substantive authority to create public policy.  Likewise, the 
legislative branch has no substantive authority to execute the laws but must 
direct their administration to the coordinate branch. 
The delegation of rulemaking authority is an efficacious tool designed 
for the constrained implementation of law, but that delegation to an executive 
branch department must comport with the balance struck in the Florida 
Constitution.  The Constitution places these agencies within the executive 
branch.  While expressly providing for control of the executive branch by 
the governor exercising the supreme executive power, the Constitution only 
supports, not creates, the legislature’s delegation of rulemaking authority.  
Statutes that articulate the scope of authority and duties of the chief inspector 
general demonstrate the legislature’s understanding and intent that certain 
agencies are still subject to the governor’s constitutional authority, even if 
the governor is not the denominated agency head.  Although this 
understanding is not expressly stated in every statute, the historical record 
proves the generally-held assumption that the governor, as chief executive, 
is responsible for and has authority over executive branch agencies unless 
the Constitution or statute provides otherwise.  The mere fact that the 
administration of an executive department was placed directly under an 
officer appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor did not 
change the governor’s authority over that agency. 
Whiley’s argument was inherently flawed.  For example, she and her 
supporting amici argued that a policy initially formulated by internal agency 
considerations, before rulemaking even began, was somehow equal in status 
to a statutorily-defined rule and thus merited the full panoply of APA process 
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if the governor participated in the initial stages.  By misusing the word 
“rule,” Whiley set up an ephemeral straw man, and invited the court to find 
some legislative policy dictating the manner in which the governor may 
communicate with agency heads about formulating policy prior to taking 
any action to establish that policy as a rule.374  One amicus illogically argued 
that “(p)reventing agencies from even initiating rule development cuts the 
public out of an important step in shaping the language of the proposed 
rule.”375  The APA requires rule development before new rulemaking and 
requires rulemaking before there is an enforceable rule.376  As the APA sets 
no time limit for initiating rule development, save certain requirements under 
Florida Statutes, section 120.54(1)(b), there is no timeline for internal policy 
formulation.  For the sake of argument, if the governor effectively shut down 
all rulemaking by prohibiting rule development, there would be no rule 
meriting public input.  Only if agencies were ordered to violate the law and 
not provide any entry point for public comment would there be a detriment 
to the public interest.  In such a case, judicial intervention through injunctive 
or other relief is available.  Hyperbole is not a substitute for cogent analysis. 
This shows the sophistry of the majority opinion.  If the majority truly 
believed that agency heads were not subject to the governor’s direction and 
supervision concerning rulemaking, they should have denied the petition.  
No violation of the APA was shown and Whiley’s full and proper remedy, if 
any, was against those agency heads purportedly failing to exercise their 
exclusive rulemaking power.  Her counsel never stated how the governor 
could enforce either executive order and thereby violate the APA.  Whiley 
clearly had sufficient available legal remedies other than seeking an 
extraordinary writ from the Supreme Court; these included bringing actions 
against the actual agency heads, whom she argued had the sole legal power 
to direct agency rulemaking.377  Whiley repeatedly stressed that the 
legislature stated the requirements for rulemaking in the APA and that only 
the statutory process controlled.378  The Governor agreed because, in reality, 
that point was never at issue.  In adopting the time requirements for 
compliance with the rulemaking procedures, the legislature provided neither 
direction for the internal processes exercised by the executive branch nor 
structure for the development of options subject to the discretion of an 
agency head.  In the end, there is no alternative to complying with the APA 
 
 374  A real straw man at least is tangible to the point of requiring actual straw. 
 375  Brief for Florida Audubon Society as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, supra note 
105, at 14. 
 376  FLA. STAT. § 120.54 (2018). 
 377  See discussion of possible actions, supra note 83. 
 378  See Petition for Writ of Quo Warranto, supra note 4, at 12, 14–18, 21–24, 30; 
Petitioner’s Amended Reply, supra note 102, at 13, 15, 17–19. 
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assurances of notice and an opportunity to be heard after the statutory 
rulemaking process is initiated.379  Indeed, Whiley’s counsel failed to point 
to any factual, legitimate, or actually threatened breach of the APA in the 
governor’s orders.380  The moot point of prohibiting statutorily required 
publication by the Department of State was never more than a minor part of 
Whiley’s argument.  Her true complaint was a policy disagreement with the 
governor. 
Regardless of the arguments, the court was responsible for the decision.  
Treating the phrase “supreme executive power” in section 1(a) as a merely 
textual embellishment, the majority took an absolutist view that 
implementing a legislatively delegated power excluded any role for 
constitutionally vested, supervisory executive power.  In doing so, the 
majority confined itself to a neatly circumscribed but flawed analysis.  So 
constrained, the majority endorsed the conclusions in AGO 81-49 as fully 
consistent with their reasoning, overlooking the failure of that earlier 
discussion to construe together all relevant clauses of article IV to give each 
their full meaning and fulfill the intent of the people in adopting the 1968 
Constitution. 
The majority’s analysis is significantly flawed because it fails to clarify 
two consequences of their decision.  The first is practical: if agency heads 
appointed by and serving at the pleasure of the governor are independent 
from gubernatorial direction and supervision in the exercise of agency 
rulemaking authority, then to whom are they accountable?  If the majority 
meant to recognize a “fourth branch of government” composed of unelected 
bureaucrats, there is little support for this proposition in the Constitution’s 
text.  The Constitution’s language shows the people intended for those 
 
 379  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §§ 120.50, 120.52(8)(a), 120.54(1), 120.56, 120.74 (2018).  One 
concludes the Florida Legislature is far more concerned with the function of implementing 
and executing the statutes over the form of internal executive branch decision making.  
 380  Oral Argument at 1:08:48, Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702 (Fla. 2011) (No. SC 11-
592), http://wfsu.org/gavel2gavel/viewcase.php?eid=212. Justice Peggy Ann Quince clearly 
asked “[w]hat is the additional step?” and Whiley’s counsel could only respond with 
speculation that OFARR could stop rulemaking initiated by citizen petition.  This argument 
showed a fundamental misunderstanding of both the APA and the governor’s orders.  The 
APA gives anyone with the requisite interest the right to request an agency to begin 
formulating policy implementing statute by initiating the formal rulemaking process. See FLA. 
STAT. § 120.54(7) (2018).  The law requires the agency to make one of three final decisions 
on that petition within 30 days.  The agency’s decision does not meet the statutory definition 
of a rule because it is not a statement of general applicability. See FLA. STAT. § 120.52(16).  
Therefore, the decision whether to grant a petition to initiate rulemaking was not a matter for 
review by OFARR under EO 11-01 or its replacement, 11-72.  However, because the decision 
to grant or deny a petition to initiate rulemaking affects the requesting party’s substantive 
interests, the APA authorized a challenge to the agency’s decision with the full panoply of 
procedural process rights afforded in Florida Statutes, sections 120.569 and 120.57, including 
judicial review of the resulting final order under Florida Statutes, section 120.68. Counsel’s 
hypothetical was not only wrong but irrelevant. 
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exercising governmental authority to be accountable to the electorate, either 
directly or through their subordination to those directly-elected officials.  
Since the majority interpreted article IV, section 6, as authorizing the 
creation of independent appointed agency heads, a reading not previously 
presumed by the other two branches, the holding also should have clarified 
how the APA provided for holding these officials accountable. 
The second consequence is the potential for administrative chaos.  One 
possible result of finding an independent “fourth branch of government” is 
the immediate replacement of all appointed agency heads with every change 
in governor.  A new governor, having no assurances that the present agency 
heads would feel bound to concur with or implement the new governor’s 
preferred policies, should be expected to remove all agency heads 
immediately upon taking office and replace them with the governor’s 
preferred interim appointees until the Senate could act.  This type of 
upheaval every four to eight years would impede policy implementation 
more than the internal executive review processes initiated by new 
governors.  Such uncertainty increases the risks of delay in addressing the 
needs of those vulnerable populations ostensibly of concern to Whiley and 
her peers. 
Understanding the flaws in Whiley’s arguments or the lapses in analysis 
applied by the majority does not answer the core question of why the 
majority adopted their position in the face of the cogent and correct 
arguments by the governor and dissenting opinions.  Ascribing motives other 
than seeking to interpret and apply the text of the Constitution is not 
supported by the opinion or the court record and would be merely 
speculative.  Yet, the majority must have had some reason to exercise the 
court’s unbridled discretion and entertain the petition in quo warranto.  
Perhaps Justice Jackson’s concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer381 provides some insight: 
The opinions of judges, no less than executives and publicists, 
often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s 
validity with the cause it is invoked to promote, of confounding 
the permanent executive office with its temporary occupant. The 
tendency is strong to emphasize transient results upon policies . . . 
and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power 
structure of our Republic.382 
The majority opinion hinged on a presumption that “the power to 
remove is not the power to control.”383  This conclusion conflicts with the 
 
 381  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring in result).  
 382  Id.  
 383  Whiley v. Scott, 79 So. 3d 702, 715 (Fla. 2011). 
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understanding of executive power held by the nation’s founders, with the 
application of that power by federal and state executive branch officers at the 
time the Florida Constitution of 1838 was developed, and with basic human 
nature.  The majority’s conclusion could be read as frustrating the intent of 
the people.  By vesting the supreme executive power in the governor, the 
people of Florida expressly intended a hierarchical exercise of the executive 
power.  If not expressly delegated by the Constitution, the authority and 
responsibility to direct and supervise at-will appointees remains in the 
governor so that no unelected subordinate exercises governmental power 
without oversight by one who is ultimately held accountable by the 
electorate. 
The Whiley majority sought to address what appeared to be a human 
problemwhich in actuality was mere hyperboleby applying a neatly 
circumscribed constitutional analysiswhich excluded full and proper 
interpretation of all the applicable textleading to a plausible conclusion, 
that fails upon full and proper constitutional construction and reasonable 
statutory interpretation.  As argued by the Governor and expressly stated by 
the legislature, the majority’s conclusion that the Governor lacked 
constitutional authority to direct and supervise his appointees was wrong. 
 
